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Abstract
This thesis is devoted to a novel approach to intertemporal decision-making. Specifically, it
applies the reference-dependent model to intertemporal choices and shows that one can model
intertemporal choice even without the assumption of time discounting.
In Chapter I , I present a brief review of the background literature, which could be of help for
our understanding of intertemporal decision-making. Specifically, it focuses on three prominent
economic theories, which are the most relevant for my work on intertemporal decision-making,
namely, the exponential discounted utility theory, the hyperbolic discounting theory, the theory of
reference-dependent preferences, and the similarity-based procedure.
In Chapter II, I present the intertemporal reference-dependent model composed of an intrinsic
consumption utility and a reference-dependent gain-loss utility which are additively separable
over time. Three simple ways of reference point determination — choice-set dependent, choice-set
independent, and hybrid reference points are also explored. In addition, I also argue that the
intertemporal reference-dependent model may offer an alternative explanation of the
experimental observations by Rubinstein (2003). Furthermore, in Chapter III, I extend the
intertemporal reference-dependent model, where an individual is uncertain about her future
circumstances, and her reference levels follow a random walk process. While the model does not
explicitly include time discounting and return on saving, it nevertheless may offer an alternative
explanation of present bias and negative time preference (future bias), and may also offer an
alternative explanation of dynamically inconsistent preferences over time.
Finally, in Chapter IV, using a survey-based within-subject choice experiment, I explore whether
subjects' behaviour is consistent with a number of existing and emerging theories, namely
hyperbolic discounting theory, Rubinstein's similarity procedure, and the novel intertemporal
reference-dependent model. The main result of the survey-based within-subject choice
experiment is that none of these three theories explain subjects' behaviour. However, I do find
that, among these three theories, the novel intertemporal reference-dependent model performs no
worse than Rubinstein's similarity procedure, and hyperbolic discounting theory performs the
worst with subjects' behaviour on subset of questions. Moreover, I could reject the hypothesis
that the subjects made their choices at random. Finally, I also found that their behaviour is not
consistent with the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
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Chapter I. An Introduction to Intertemporal Decision-Making and Loss Aversion
An Introduction to Intertemporal
Decision-Making and Loss Aversion
Abstract: In this chapter, I provide a brief review of the background literature,
which could be of help for our understanding of intertemporal decision-making. Here,
I review three prominent economic theories, which are the most relevant for my
theoretical and experimental work on intertemporal decision-making, namely, the
exponential discounted utility theory, the hyperbolic discounting theory, the theory of
reference-dependent preferences, and the similarity-based procedure. Aim of this
chapter is to provide motivation and background for my thesis on intertemporal
decision-making and loss aversion.
Chapter I. An Introduction to Intertemporal Decision-Making and Loss Aversion
1. Introduction
The growing body of experimental research suggests that neoclassical theory of
individual choice is at odds with observed human behaviour. Being one of the most
important human activities, intertemporal decision-making has been of a particular
interest to economists for at least one hundred years and the exploration of
intertemporal decision-making could be dated back to as early as Adam Smith.
Despite this long history of research on decision-making over time, economists still
disagree about what is the best way to model it.
In this chapter, I give a brief review of three prominent economic theories, which
could be of help for our understanding of intertemporal decision-making, and which
are the most relevant to my work on intertemporal decision-making. I begin with the
review of the main features and the criticism of the exponential discounted utility
theory (due to Samuelson, Review of Economic Studies, 1973), which is the main
neoclassical theory of intertemporal choice. I next review the most prominent
alternative to this theory, which is the hyperbolic discounting theory and was widely
popularized by Laibson (QJE, 1997). After that, I present the theory of
reference-dependent preferences due to Kahneman and Tversky (Econometrica,
1979), which is central to my theoretical model of intertemporal decision-making.
2
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Finally, I present the similarity-based procedure due to Rubinstein (JET, 1988),
which is important for my experimental work. This review is aimed to provide
motivational background for my thesis on loss aversion in intertemporal
decision-making.1
The earliest approach to intertemporal decision-making behaviour involved a
combination of different psychological motives, which either promote or suppress
th
desires for immediate consumption. In the first half of the 20 century, the observed
intertemporal decision-making behaviour was modelled using the concepts of the
marginal rate of substitution of consumption bundle over time, and of diminishing
marginal utility.
In his ground-breaking work, "A Note on Measurement of Utility" (1937),
Samuelson introduced a parsimonious model of intertemporal preferences by
compressing all psychological factors underlying intertemporal choice into the
discount rate. Since then, the exponential discounted utility model has dominated
economic theory of intertemporal decision-making. Although the exponential
discounted utility model has been applied to analyse intertemporal decision-making
in a variety of situations, including savings behaviour, labour supply, etc., it has been
1 Here I focus on some important works and the most recent studies covering two areas that are
relevant to my thesis - namely, intertemporal choice anomalies and loss aversion. I thus leave out the
theoretical models that involve modifications of the instantaneous utility function, such as
habit-formation models, utility-from-anticipation models, visceral-influences models, projection-bias
models, etc. (for discussion on these alternative models see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue
(2002)).
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found to be inconsistent with both empirical and experimental findings on
intertemporal choice by cognitive psychologists and economists. A few insightful
empirical and experimental studies criticised the exponential discounted utility
theory and have led to a number of alternative theoretical models.
This chapter is organized as follows. The exponential discounted utility theory and
its criticism are discussed in Section 2; while three alternative theoretical models are
discussed in subsequent sections. Section 3 is devoted to the hyperbolic discounting
theory, which captures the observation that individuals' preferences are inconsistent
over time; Section 4 presents the theory of reference-dependent preferences, which
captures the observation that individuals evaluate consumption bundles relatively to
some reference points; and Section 5 describes similarity procedure, which
fundamentally departs from framework of the exponential discounted utility model.
Finally, Section 6,1 discuss how the present thesis fits into the existing literature.
2. The Exponential Discounted Utility Model and Its
Criticism
In this section, I introduce the exponential discounted utility model, and present
4
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several empirical and experimental observations, which question the validity of the
exponential discounted utility model.
2.1. The Exponential Discounted Utility Model
The exponential discounted utility model of Samuelson (1937) states that a decision
maker's intertemporal preferences over a sequence of consumption profiles,
(ct,...,cT), could be represented by an intertemporal utility function:
T-t ( ^ \k
U{ct,...,cT)=YJ u(ct+k),
k=0\} +P)
where u(») is the person's cardinal instantaneous utility function, and p is the
discount rate for one period, and captures all psychological factors that motivate the
intertemporal decision-making. Under assumptions of completeness, transitivity and
continuity, a sequence of consumption profiles, (ct,...,cT), will be preferred to
another sequence [ct,..., c'T ), if and only if the following inequality is satisfied:
U(c,Cj) > u(ct,...,Cj j.
A central assumption of the exponential discounted utility model concerns
individuals' preferences of adding a new consumption bundle into an exiting
consumption plan. For example, when an additional consumption prospect
,xT) is available to be added into an exiting consumption bundle (c,,...,cr),
5
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an individual will accept the additional consumption prospect X if and only if the
utility of the aggregate consumption bundle (cn...,cr), which is adjusted by the
additional consumption prospect X, is higher than the utility of the existing
consumption plan (cn...,cT), such that u(c'l,...,c'T)> U(ct,...,cT), where (cn...,c'T)
is the aggregate consumption bundle.
In addition, the exponential discounted utility model explicitly assumes that an
individual's intertemporal preferences over a consumption bundle should be
independent from her previous consumption experiences or future consumption
prospects.
Furthermore, in the exponential discounted utility model, for example, apples and
bananas are explicitly assumed discounted at the same rate. Hence, there is a unitary
time preferences across all kinds of consumption. In addition, the discount rate p is
constant over time. For example, if a consumption bundle (ct,...,cT) is preferred
over another one (cj,...,c^.) where ct = ct , then the consumption bundle
(c[+x,...,cT) should also be preferred over the consumption bundle (cj+1,...,c^.). In
other words, with the passage of time, an individual's current preferences are
confirmed by her previous decision, such that her preferences are consistent over
time.
6
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In addition, the discounted utility model also assumes that the cardinal instantaneous
utility function «(•) is stationary over time and individuals have positive time
preference, which motivates an individual to accumulate consumption towards the
present.
2.2. Criticism of the Exponential Discounted Utility Model from
Experiment
Over the last two decades, a number of empirical and experimental studies on
intertemporal decision-making have documented a large number of inadequacies of
the descriptive validity of the exponential discounted utility model. First of all, these
studies questioned the positive time preference, and also have documented discount
rates are diminishing over time rather than constant over time, which is often referred
to as hyperbolic discounting. Furthermore, discount rates differ across different types
of intertemporal situations, such that gains are discounted more than losses, small
amounts of consumption are discounted more than large amounts of consumption,
and sequences of consumption bundles are discounted differently from a single
consumption bundle.
A number of researchers have put the assumption of positive time preference in the
7
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questionable position. Koopmans (1960), Koopmans, Peter Diamond, and Richard
Williamson (1964), Olson and Bailey (1981) argue that a zero or negative time
preference with a positive real interest rate on saving will lead an individual to
postpone consumption rather than accelerate consumption towards the present.
Thaler (1981) reported that when subjects are required to specify the amount of
money that would make them indifferent between receiving $ 15 now and receiving
the specified amount of money later, subjects averagely require $20 for one month
waiting, $50 for one year waiting, and $100 for ten years waiting, which appeared a
declining discount rate. The similar pattern of declining discount rate over time are
also be found by a large number of researchers, (see Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil
(1989); Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross (1991); Redelmeier and Heller (1993); Chapman
and Elstein (1995); Kirby and Marakovic (1995); Myerson and Green (1995);
Chapman (1996); Pender (1996); Kirby (1997)).
In addition, in the terms of the standard exponential discounted utility model, an
individual's preferences over two intertemporal options, which are a small and
sooner payoff and a large but later payoff, should depend merely on the absolute time
interval that separates these two payoffs. In fact, an individual's choice over these
two payoffs might change when both of them are delayed by a given time periods.
For example, in a study of Thaler (1981), an individual might prefer one apple today
8
Chapter I. An Introduction to Intertemporal Decision-Making and Loss Aversion
to two apples tomorrow, but at the same time she might prefer two apples in 51 days
to one apple in 50 days. Therefore, an individual's intertemporal preferences are
dynamically inconsistent over time. The similar pattern of inconsistent preferences
over time was also found by a large number of researchers in humans (see Solnick,
Kannenberg, Eckerman, and Waller (1980); Millar and Navarick (1984); Green,
Fristoe, and Myerson (1994); Kirby and Herrnstein (1995)) and in animals (see
Ainslie and Herrnstein (1981); Green, Fischer, Perlow, and Sherman (1981)).
The assumption of the stationary cardinal instantaneous utility function has been also
considered unrealistic, especially in the research on how an individual changes her
taste over time. Suranovic, Goldfarb, and Leonard (1999), and O'Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a, 2002) discuss the effect of non-stationarities on addictive behaviour.
Furthermore, Loewenstein and Angner (2003) discuss various factors that can entail
changes in preferences - including appetites, emotions, social influence, and etc.
Apart from declining discount rates, many studies on intertemporal decision-making
found that gains are discounted more than losses. For example, in a study by Thaler
(1981), subjects were asked to imagine to pay a traffic ticket either now or later, and
to specify the amount ofmoney they would be willing to pay if they could pay it later.
The discount rates observed from this study were significantly lower than the
discount rates revealed from answers to comparable questions about monetary gains.
More precisely, Thaler (1981) estimated that discount rates for gains were three to
9
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ten times greater than those for losses. Furthermore, Loewenstein (1988) found a
similar pattern that gains are discounted more than losses.
In addition, many experimental studies of time preference have also found the
diminishing sensitivity in a sense that large monetary outcomes are discounted more
than small ones. For instance, subjects in a study of Thaler (1981) were on average
indifferent between receiving $ 15 immediately and receiving $60 in a year, and were
also on average indifferent between receiving $250 immediately and $350 in a year,
as well as on average between an immediate $3000 and $4000 in a year. Similar
results were also found by many other studies (see Loewenstein (1987); Benzion,
Rapoport, and Yagil (1989); Redelmeier and Heller (1993)).
Furthermore, Loewenstein (1988) observed an asymmetric preference between
speeding up and delaying consumption, as monetary compensation for delaying an
expected consumption by a given interval was from two to four times greater than
the amount of money subjects would be willing to pay to speed up an unexpected
consumption by the same interval. For instance, subjects who expected to receive a
VCR immediately would require, on average, a compensation of $126 to delay the
consumption of VCR by a year; on the other hand, those who didn't expect to have
the same item for another year would be on average willing to pay $54 to have it
immediately.
10
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2.3. Alternatives to the Exponential Discounted Utility Model
In response to the above-mentioned observations as well as other intertemporal
choice "anomalies", economists have proposed a large number of alternatives to the
exponential discounted utility model. Some of these new models, such as hyperbolic
discounting theory, attempt to achieve more descriptive validity by modifying the
assumption of constant discount rates. The hyperbolic discounting theory will be
discussed in detail in Section 3.
Other alternative models borrow insights from the behavioural theory in a static
setting and introduce more assumptions of the instantaneous utility function. One of
the prominent "static" theories suggests that individual's preferences are defined over
changes of the level of wealth relative to his or her reference level, rather than
depend merely on the absolute final level of outcome; and individuals are more
sensitive to losses than gains. In other words, decision under risk can be viewed as a
choice between "prospects". Model of reference-dependent preferences could go
back to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and will be discussed in detail in Section 4.
Other studies fundamentally depart from the neoclassical theory of choice by taking
ll
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seriously the cognitive imperfections documented by cognitive psychologists. One of
such fundamentally different models, Rubinstein's (1988) similarity procedure, will
be discussed in detail in Section 5.
3. Hyperbolic Discounting Theory
Probably, the most prominent alternative to the exponential discounted utility model
is hyperbolic discounting theory, which concerns one of the fundamental
assumptions of the exponential discounted utility model - consistency of an
individual's preferences. In response to the above-mentioned experimental studies,
hyperbolic discounting theory was introduced in the middle of 20 century. This
theory accounts for the diminishing discount rates, which are inconsistent with the
exponential discounted utility model involving a sequence of constant discount rates,
and reveal that a person would have inconsistent preferences over time.
In the exponential discounted utility model, an individual's preferences are consistent
and coherent over time, which are captured by an exponential discounting function
with a constant discount rate. However, there are numerous experimental studies in
both animal and human behaviour that find that the individual's preferences are
12
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dynamically inconsistent, leading to a possibility that people's preferences might be
instead captured by hyperbolic discounting theory, which postulates that an
individual has a relatively high discount rate over short time periods and a relatively
low discount rate over long time periods.
3.1. Models of the Hyperbolic Discounting Theory
Phelps and Pollak (1968) introduced a simplified functional form of hyperbolic
discounting theory to capture experimental results from studies of animal and human
behaviour in cognitive psychology. After the influential work of Laibson (1997),
hyperbolically discounted utility function has been used to replace the standard
exponential discounted utility model in analysing decision-making over
intertemporal choices.
Study of hyperbolic discounting theory could be dated back to Strotz (1956). Phelps
and Pollak (1968) proposed a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function to capture
experimental results from studies of animal and human behaviour in cognitive
psychology. Hyperbolic discounting theory predicts that an individual would have a
high discount rate in the near future and a relatively low discount rate in the farther
future. This phenomena is captured by the following function
13
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u(x0,x,,...,x„...) = u(x0)+ , where the function u(x) is the
instantaneous utility function, hence the discount factor in discrete time periods are
\,J3S,J3S2 ,/3Sirespectively.
Hence, the hyperbolic discounting theory illustrates a salient inconsistency between
human being's current preferences and those in the future. For example, the discount
rate between time periods t and t +1 is the long-term discount rate from the
current view, and it is lower than the discount rate between time periods t and t +1
from the perspective of time t, which is labelled as the short-term high discount
rate.
In the influential work of Laibson (1997), hyperbolic discounting function with
parameters of J3 and 8, has been used to explore the role of illiquid assets, such as
housing. Laibson (1997) suggested that a person could hold her wealth in illiquid
assets as an imperfect technology of self-control to protect herself from
over-consumption. Furthermore, without the technology of self-control, Laibson
(1998) use hyperbolic discounting functions successfully explaining how a person
makes a choice between consumption today and saving for tomorrow .
2
Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001), test the hyperbolic discounting theory
in the consumption-saving environment by comparing simulated data to real-world data, and conclude
that hyperbolic discounting could explain a variety of empirical observations better than exponential
discounting, especially about low liquid assets holdings, high credit-card debt, and consumption-income
comovement.
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O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001) have applied the hyperbolic discounting function,
associated with parameters of /? and 8, to explore preferences to procrastination,
in which a person underestimates the magnitude of her self-control problems in the
future and would never stop trying to figure out an better plan. Hence, she would
postpone some easy tasks, and eventually, she have to face the accumulated hard task.
In addition, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, and 2000), and Gruber and Kdszegi
(2000) have applied hyperbolic discounting theory, associated with parameters of (5
and 5, to explain why some individuals tend to consume too much of some harmful
addictive products.
Specially, Rubinstein (2003) proposed the following function formulation of the
hyperbolic discounting theory:
C/(c0,Cj ,) = y(c0)+ XK2i_ (TX_i>2 , 8S \>{ct),
where the function v is the concave instantaneous utility function, and 8, < 1 is a
(weakly) increasing sequence therefore the time discounting factors in discrete time
periods are not constant, namely 1,Sl,SlS2,...,n„=1,2^ fi*nctional form
the discount rates are (weakly) decreasing over time rather than a constant sequence.
3.2. Rubinstein's Challenge
15
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Although, the hyperbolic discounting theory could successfully explain a variety of
empirical observations and experimental results in the literature on consumption and
saving, procrastination, as well as consumption of addictive products, and is better
than the standard exponential discounted utility model, the validity of hyperbolic
discounting theory has also received some challenge.
In a recent study, Rubinstein (2003) introduced three experimental observations,
which challenge descriptive validity of not only the standard exponential discounted
utility model but the hyperbolic discounting theory with an increasing and concave
instantaneous utility function as well.
For example, in the study of Rubinstein (2003), subjects were asked (in the year of
2002) to choose the favourite option from either the question 1 or the question 2 in
the following two questions:
Question 1. To choose between the following two options:
"A: Receiving $467.00 on June 17th 2004", and
"B: Receiving $607.07 on June 17th 2005".
Question 2. To choose between the following two options:
"C: Receiving 467.00 on June 16th 2005", and
"D: Receiving 467.39 on June 17th 2005".
Choosing delay (option B) in question 1 and no delay (option C) in question 2 is
16
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inconsistent with the general hyperbolic discounting utility function
t/(c0,c,,...,ct,) = ^(c0)+X,=1>2,...(11=1,2 /XO, where the function v is the
concave instantaneous utility function, and Ss < 1 is a (weakly) increasing sequence
therefore the time discounting factors in discrete time periods are not constant,
namely lAAsi>"'>Th-\,2 A"
Choosing "C" in question 2 implies that<5.c(467.39)-u(467.39-0.39)<0, where
t* = 17/06/2005 . The concavity of v and the fact that the discount rate is
monotonic decreasing imply that 8su(x) - o(x - 0.39) < 0 for any amount ofmoney
x> 467.00 and s earlier than June 17th 2005.
Srv(607.07) < D(607.07 - 0.39)
£ . ^.0(607.07) < Sr 607.07 - 2 x (0.39)) < ^._365^(607.07 - 2 x (0.39))
S,._2S:.J:m(60T07)< S,._/,._msu(607.07 - 3 x (o.39))< _K^(607.07 - 3 x (0.39))
S,...sru(607.07)< 8,... J. 365u(607 -365x (0.39))
Therefore, the straightforward calculation implies that
(TL„ ,. M607 07>- f(607.07-365 x (0.39)) <0 . In fact that
607.07-365(0.39) < 140.07 completes the proof. Therefore, choosing "B" in
question 1 but choosing option "C" in question 2 are incompatible not only with the
standard exponential discounted utility model but also with hyperbolic discounting
theory.
17
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Rubinstein (2003) reported that subjects would prefer B to A and C to D, which are
obviously different from all generalised discounted utility model, because those
models predict subjects would prefer either A & C or B&D or A&D but never B&C.












Two hundred forty-eight out of 456 subjects chose delay (option B) in question 1 and
no delay (option C) in question2. If subjects' choices are made randomly, then such a
result would be observed with a probability of 3%. The results demonstrate subjects'
choice is inconsistent with the hyperbolic discounting theory.
Rubinstein (2003) thus argued that his experimental findings cannot be explained by
the hyperbolic discounting theory. Instead, his findings may be better explained by
the similarity procedure. The theoretical model of Rubinstein's similarity procedure
is presented in Section 5.
18
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4. Reference-Dependent Preferences
Apart from the diminishing discount rate, other anomalies mentioned in Section 2
could be understood as a misspecification of the instantaneous utility function.
Based on findings from a number of psychological experiments, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) propose three important
modifications to instantaneous utility function - namely, that individuals' preferences
are defined over changes of the level of wealth relative to his or her reference level,
rather than depend merely on the absolute final level of wealth; that individuals are
more sensitive to losses than gains; and that individuals have diminishing sensitivity
for both gains and losses, captured by an S-shaped utility function that is concave
over gains and convex over losses. In fact, an individual's utility is determined upon
gains and losses instead of the final level of wealth was first analysed by Markowitz
(1952), and is consistent with the way how people distinguish attributes such as
brightness, loudness, and temperature comparing to previous levels, rather than
evaluating those attributes in the term of absolute levels.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) originally proposed the prospect theory for gambles
with two non-zero outcomes. They proposed that when people face a gamble,
3
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed a generalized vision of prospect theory, sometimes known
as cumulative prospect theory, which extents the main result in the original prospect theory into gambles
with more than two outcomes.
19
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(.x,p;y,q), which means that the gamble offers an outcome x with probability p,
and an outcome y with probability q, where x < 0 < y or y < 0 < x , people
evaluate the final outcome of this gamble as following:
V(x,p;y,q) = 7r(p)u(x)+x(q)u(y),
where u is the value function, and n is the probability transformation function,
presented in Diagram 1. In fact, the sum of probabilities p + q may be less than
unit, in this circumstance this gamble offers a zero outcome with a probability of
l-p-q.
Whenever p + q = 1 and either x > y > 0 or x < y < 0 the above utility function
can be expressed as following:
V(x, p; y, q) = u(y) + 7r{p\v{x)-o(y)].
Therefore, the utility or the value of a gamble with strictly positive outcomes or
strictly negative outcomes can be represented as the value of outcome that is the
small one in the term of absolute value plus the difference of value between the
outcomes weighed by the transformed probability of the other one.
20
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Diagram 1. Kahneman and Tversky's value function uand probability transformation function n
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offered a series of experimental results, which violate
the prediction of expected utility theory, as the evidences that people evaluate utility
upon the changes ofwealth status, gains and losses. The level of the reference points,
which people calculate gains or losses relative to, are not constants, although in most
circumstances the reference point coincides to the individual's current level of wealth.
There are some other ways, in which people evaluate the gains and losses relative to
a particular status of wealth either in the past or an expectation level of wealth that is
different from the current one. Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999), and Breiter,
Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, and Shizgal (2001) (see also Koszegi and Rabin (2006))
document that an individual's expectations of outcome significantly affect the
determination of reference level. Therefore, the reference point may depend on the
individual's memory of the past or expectation for the future.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) accommodate the S-shaped utility function with a
separately defined discount function to explain anomalies that are inconsistent with
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discounted more than small outcomes; gains are discounted more than losses; and the
delay-speedup asymmetry where people would require more compensations for delay
an expected consumption than their willingness to pay to speed up an unexpected
consumption.
In addition, Loewenstein and Adler (1995), Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), as
well as Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) proposed that an individual derives a
consumption utility as well as a gain-loss utility from difference between the
consumption relative and her reference level, where the gain-loss utility satisfies
properties proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman
(1991).
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) explore a two-period consumption-saving
model and predict that when information about an individual's future income is
available, this information would significantly affect her consumption growth rate,
which would be different from predictions of the standard Permanent Income
Hypothesis4, that changes in future income should not affect the growth rate of
consumption. The similar results are also found by Shea (1995 a, b).
4
By using panel data, Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2003) examined the effects of reference level of income
on the behaviour of young male physicians. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2003) reported that the reference
level of income has a strong positive effect on subsequence income of those physicians whose current
incomes are lower than their reference level, but has no effect on those physicians whose current
incomes are equal to or higher than their reference level. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2003) showed that the
data is inconsistent with predictions of the traditional Permanent Income Hypothesis, but the data could
be explained by the reference-dependent preferences.
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Koszegi and Rabin (2006) proposed that an individual's utility depends both on
consumption, and on her reference level, and both of consumption and her reference
level are K-dimensional vectors. She gets utility from consumption, which is
additively separable across dimensions, and a gain-loss utility in each dimension. In
each dimension, the gain-loss utility depends on a universal gain-loss function, which
satisfies properties proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Tversky and
Kahneman (1991), captures utility caused by deviation of consumption level from
her reference level.
In the work of Koszegi and Rabin (2006), an individual's reference level is her
current rational expectation about outcomes. Therefore, a person's expectation would
significantly affect her preferences; on the other hand, her preferences would also
significantly affect her expectation. In other words, her choices would depend on her
reference level; at the meanwhile, her reference level would depend on her expected
choices, which is capture by the concept of personal equilibrium.
A close work to the present thesis is done by Koszegi and Rabin (2007), who develop
a model of reference-dependent preferences, where an individual's utility depends
both on consumption and recent changes in beliefs about present and future
consumption, and she is loss-aversion over changes in planed consumption. In each
time period, an individual's purpose is to maximize discounted expected utility given
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her past expectations and her future behaviours and plans must be optimal. Koszegi
and Rabin (2007) predict that an individual would prefer to receive all infonnation
together rather than separately to avoid her beliefs fluctuating; and she would also
prefer to receive all information early rather than later because the earlier the
information received the less the effect of the information on her beliefs and the less
her beliefs fluctuating . Koszegi and Rabin (2007) also predict that in a circumstance
of two-period consumption-savings an individual may over consume in early time
period relative to her optimal plan and the more uncertainty about future the more
over consumption is, but loss-aversion of lowering future consumption relative to her
optimal plan will reduce her over consumption in early time period.
Apart from implications in analysing intertemporal decision-making,
reference-dependent model5 has been widely used to analyse labour supply,
anomalies observed in stock market study, etc. Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and
Thaler (1997) observe negative wage elasticities in NYC cab drivers based on the
one-day unit of observation, which means that drives' labour supply is driven by loss
aversion, and their decision is made over a daily income target as their reference
level.
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) proposed a model of reference-dependent
5 Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, and Sugden (1997) test a set of predictions derived from the
theory of reference-dependent preferences, such as divergence between willingness-to-accept and
willingness-to-pay, and conclude that the theory of reference-dependent preferences successfully
explains these observations.
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preferences, and explained equity premium puzzle, volatility puzzle, and
predictability puzzle. The reference-dependent model illustrates a long period
predictability in stock returns, which is consistent with the observed data. Therefore a
positive dividend drives a high stock return, which in turn reduces the investor's risk
aversion by the prior gains working as a cushion; furthermore the reduced risk
aversion pushes the stock price upward further. A negative dividend, on the other
hand, causes the investor to be more risk averse and pushes the stock price
downward. Hence there is more volatility in stock returns than in the underlying
dividends. In addition, the model generates a weak correlation between the stock
returns and consumption. In the circumstance of heterogeneity, if the loss aversion is
an aggregate characteristic of investors, and this loss aversion depends upon the prior
stock market performances, the model still produces a high premium, high volatility,
and predictability.
Heidhues and Koszegi (2005) develop a model where a profit-maximizing
monopolist with uncertain cost of production sells to rational consumers with loss
aversion. There are two circumstances of timing. In the first one, a monopolist, who
sells to a single rational consumer with loss aversion, would first commit a pricing
distribution, which the consumer observes. Then, the consumer would form
expectations about her purchase behaviour. When the firm's price is realized, the
consumer would suffer a shock to her willingness of purchase. After that, the
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consumer would decide whether to buy. In the other situation, the consumer would
first form expectations about her purchase behaviour. Then, the firm would observe
its costs, commit a pricing distribution, and pin down a realized price. When the
firm's price is realized, the consumer would suffer a shock to her willingness of
purchase. After that, the consumer would decide whether to buy.
Heidhues and Koszegi (2005) predict that if the price is stochastically distributed, the
consumer would suffer losses from purchase at higher price than what she expects or
other realized prices, which is defined as comparison effect. This comparison effect,
in turn, would be the force behind the price stickiness that means the firm would face
a limited number of choices of price to charge even its marginal costs are
continuously distributed, and the counter-cyclical markups, which means the firm
would be reluctant to offer a low price when it takes into account that the consumer
would compare the low price with any other higher price and decrease her
willingness to buy when the price is high. Furthermore, Heidhues and Koszegi (2005)
also predict that if the consumer expects purchase with a high probability, then her
expectation would increase her willingness to buy. This probably explains why a firm
would randomly offer low sale price to attract consumers' willingness to buy.
Heidhues and Koszegi (2006) develop a model of price competition with
differentiated products, where consumer is loss averse over changes between her
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recent expectations of purchase and the realized purchase price and her satisfaction
with the realized purchase, and firms with uncertain costs of production decide on
prices after observing their own realized cost of production. Heidhues and Koszegi
(2006) find that consumer's sensitivity to loss aversion has a positive effect on the
intensity of competition, such that the more consumers are loss aversion the more
demand is sensitive to price, which in turn leads to a higher intensive competition. In
addition, this tendency is stronger at high price than at low price. Heidhues and
Koszegi (2006) also predict that if and only if difference between two realized costs
is not larger than a given constant, then there will be an equilibrium, where all firms
will charge the same price for differentiated products. In addition, Heidhues and
Koszegi (2006) predict that when firms face common stochastic costs, in any
symmetric equilibrium, the countercyclical markup is decreasing in cost, and that in
many situations prices are completely sticky. Futhermore, this tendency is stronger in
less competitive industries.
Another close work to the present thesis is done by Tu (2004), who explores a
structural model of reference-dependent preferences for intertemporal
decision-making. Tu (2004) considered four scenarios, namely, delay of gains, delay
of losses, speed-up of gains, and speed-up of losses, and estimated the coefficient
of loss aversion in riskless intertemporal choice by using the panel data from a
six-year Dutch representative household survey. In the survey, each subject would
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face four questions, which would concern either delay or speed-up gains from
winning a prize in the National Lottery or losses from paying a tax. In the time
horizon of one year, Tu (2004) reported that the average coefficient of loss aversion
is approximately two; the reference level of delay is larger than that of speedup;
females are more sensitive to loss than males; and high-educated people and senior
people are less loss-averse and more patient.
As one can see from above, alternative models of intertemporal decision-making
mostly developed in two directions, either generalising the discounting function or
incorporating more assumptions into the instantaneous utility function. These
improvements in understanding time-preference benefit from importing more
insights from psychological research. In the next section, I present the similarity
procedure which is fundamentally different all generalized discounted utility models.
5. Rubinstein's Similarity Procedure
Most of the above-mentioned alternative models of intertemporal choice belong to a
class of generalized discounted utility models as they employ two components - a
time discounting function and an instantaneous utility function.
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The similarity procedure, developed in Rubinstein (1988), is fundamentally different
from the exponential discounted utility model and its alternatives mentioned in the
previous sections as this procedure places the cognitive imperfections into the center
of analysis. The concept of similarity was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky
(1977) and further defined by Rubinstein (1988).
In the process of decision-making under risk, Rubinstein (1988) emphasize that the
decision maker would go through three steps following the similarity procedure. For
a two-lotteries circumstance Lx = (x,, px) and L2 = (x2, p2) , people would fist
check if one lottery stochastically dominates the other. For instance, if both jc, > x2
and px > p2 then Lx>- L2, the choice is done. If the first step is not decisive then
move to step 2, and people would compare outcomes and the associated probability
in terms of similarity or dissimilarity. For example, ifpx ~ p2, and xx > x2 then
Lx> L2, the option is selected. If the second step is not decisive, for example, the
lotteries are similar on one dimension but dissimilar on the other, such as xx ~ x2,
and px > p2 then Lx> L2, the dissimilar dimension determine which option is
selected. Otherwise, if above steps are not decisive then move to step 3, which is not
specified.6
When an individual faces intertemporal choices, the probabilities of risky outcomes
6
For a similar theory (Vague theory) see Manzini and Mariotti (2004, and 2006).
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are simply replaced by the time period in intertemporal choices. For example,
conditional on that time is defined between 0 and 1, 0 in the intertemporal choices
intuitively means a simultaneous event; on the other hand, 1 in the intertemporal
choices intuitively means an event would happen in the infinite future.
The most problematic characteristic of this approach, as discussed in Rubinstein
(1988) and in Rubinstein (2003), is that the third step might be inconsistent with the
first two steps. Apart from the inconsistence between the first two steps and the third
one, Rubinstein's similarity procedure explains experimental behaviour that could
not be explained by either the standard exponential discounted utility model or
hyperbolic discounting theory, but does not explain all the experimental behaviours,
such as heterogeneity among subjects.
Leland (1994) modifies the similarity procedure proposed by Rubinstein (1988), and
applies it to lotteries with multiple outcomes and probabilities, such as
Li=(xi\>P\\\xn>Pn>~'>x\»*Pu) and L2=(x2„p2l;x22,p22-,...;x2n,p2n) . In this
situation, if a decision is not made in the first step, Leland (1994) emphasizes that the
decision-maker would compare outcomes and their corresponding probability across
lotteries in terms of equity or inequality to identify the dominant choice. Once each
pair of comparisons is done, an option would be selected if it dominates the other in
any pair of comparisons and is equal to the other in rest dimensions, such as
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xu = x2l and pu = p2]. Otherwise, the decision-maker would process the third step,
in which she would compare outcomes and their corresponding probability across
lotteries in terms of similarity and dissimilarity, to identify the optimal choice. If
there is still not a decision made, then choice would be randomly selected.
In addition, Leland (2000) applies the similarity-based procedure in analysing
examples of intertemporal choices to offer explanation of anomalies of the
exponential discounted utility model, such as common ratio, common difference, and
reflection effect, and conclude that if choice is decided upon, at least in part,
similarity procedure, those anomalies could be reasonably understood by the
similarity procedure.
6. The Relationship of the Present Thesis to the
Existing Literature
An increasing number of researchers both in the field of economics and psychology
pointed out that some of the fundamental assumptions in the traditional economics
are unrealistic in the terms of psychology, and attempted to offer some alternative
models which may improve our understanding of human behaviour. Surprisingly,
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there have been little work done that apply insights from psychological research to
one of the most important human activity, intertemporal decision-making.
Among many alternative models developed in response to recent experimental
evidence, reference-dependent model emerged as one of the more realistic and more
capable of capturing individual choices in the static situation. Thus, my main
contribution to the existing literature is to apply the reference-dependent model to
intertemporal decision making and to show that one can model intertemporal choices
without the assumptions of time discounting.
In the Chapter II, I present an alternative to the exponential discounted utility model
and the hyperbolic discounting theory. My alternative approach is based on the
reference-dependent preferences, which is described in Section 4 of Chapter I . The
closest work to the novel theoretical model presented in Chapter II is Koszegi and
Rabin (2007). In addition, my novel approach (presented in Chapter II) could also
offer an alternative explanation of observations by Rubinstein (2003) described in
Section 3.2 ofChapter I .
In Chapter III, I further extend the model of Chapter II to a situation where an
individual is uncertain about her future reference point. In Chapter III, an
individual's reference levels are assumed to follow a random walk process to capture
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uncertainty about future circumstances. Hence, her reference levels could increase,
decrease, or remain the same relatively to her current reference level. The
intertemporal reference-dependent model may offer an alternative explanation for the
present bias, future bias, and dynamic inconsistency over time discussed in Section
2.2 ofChapter I .
I find that the novel reference-dependent model of intertemporal choice, presented in
Chapters II and III, could explain some of the anomalies of intertemporal choice -
namely, the future bias, and the dynamic inconsistency over time - even without the
assumption of time discounting.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I present the results of a survey-based within-subject choice
experiment and explore whether subjects' behaviour is consistent with three possible
theories of intertemporal choice - namely, the hyperbolic discounting theory
(described in Section 2 of Chapter I ), Rubinstein's similarity procedure (presented
in Section 5 of Chapter I ), and the novel intertemporal model of
reference-dependent preferences, (explored in Chapter II and Chapter III of the
present thesis). While I find that my novel theoretical model does not explain all
subjects' behaviour, it nevertheless performs no worse than Rubinstein's similarity
procedure, and better than the hyperbolic discounting theory.
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Intertemporal Reference-Dependent
Model
Abstract: In this chapter, I extend the reference-dependent model to intertemporal
choices and show that one can model intertemporal choice even without the
assumption of time discounting. Using the idea of mental accounting, I assume that
in each time period, the individual cares about the absolute level of consumption in
that time period, and, in addition, about how this level of consumption compares to
the reference consumption in that time period. Moreover, when the consumption
level falls short of her reference level, she experiences loss aversion. Thus, her
instantaneous utility has two components, and I assume that these two components
are additively separable. While there are multiple ways of how individual reference
points could be formed, in this chapter I only focus on three simple ways of reference
point determination - choice-set dependent, choice-set independent, and hybrid
reference points. In this chapter, I also argue that the intertemporal
reference-dependent model may offer an alternative explanation of the experimental
observations by Rubinstein (2003).
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1. Introduction
The growing body of psychological experimental findings suggests that individuals'
preferences are significantly different from what is commonly assumed in
neo-classical economic theory. As one of the most important human activities,
intertemporal decision-making involves tradeoffs among consumptions in different
time periods. For at least one hundred years, economists have been trying to
understand and explain how individuals make decisions over intertemporal
perspectives, with literature on the subject dating back as early as to Adam Smith.
Since Samuelson (1937) developed his parsimonious model of intertemporal
preferences by compressing all psychological factors underlying intertemporal
choices into a single parameter, the exponential discounted utility model has
dominated economic analysis of intertemporal choices. Although the exponential
discounted utility model has been applied to analyse a large number of intertemporal
choice situations, including savings behaviour, labour supply, etc., it has also
received much criticism from both empirical research on intertemporal choices and
experimental results in cognitive psychology (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O'Donoghue (2002), also see Section 2.2 of Chapter I of this thesis). In response to
those criticisms, economists have proposed a number of alternatives by either
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modifying the assumption of constant discount rate or incorporating more
assumptions of the instantaneous utility function.
Probably the most prominent alternative to the exponential discounted utility model
is the hyperbolic discounting theory, which was first introduced by Strotz (1956) and
further studied by Phelps and Pollak (1968). This theory is based on the findings
from studies of animal and human behaviour in cognitive psychology. Especially
after Laibson (1997) applied hyperbolic discounting theory to explore the role of
illiquid assets, such as housing, as an imperfect technology of self-control,
hyperbolic discounting theory become more and more influential. Hyperbolic
discounting theory concerns the consistency of an individual's time preferences. It
captures the phenomenon that a person's time preferences exhibit a relatively high
discount rate over short time horizon and a relatively low discount rate over long
time horizon. In other words, time discount rate is declining over time rather than
constant over time. In addition, the hyperbolic discounting theory also implies the
present bias in a sense that a person would choose to realize consumption
immediately rather than delaying them for even for a little bit.
Although hyperbolic discounting theory successfully modified the assumption of
constant discount rates to capture the phenomenon of diminishing time discount rates,
its descriptive validity has been challenged by a recent experimental study, which is
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presented in Section 3.2 of Chapter I , by Rubinstein (2003), who suggested that in
the experiments designed to challenge the standard neoclassical theory of
n
intertemporal choice, the similarity procedure would fit experimental data better
than hyperbolic discounting theory. When faced with two intertemporal options, an
individual would compare outcomes and the associated date in terms of similarity
and dissimilarity, and choose the favourite one. As discussed in Rubinstein (1988) as
well as in Rubinstein (2003), if decision is not made in two specified decisive steps
then similarity procedure does not have specified predictions, which may be
inconsistent with the previous steps.
In this chapter, I extend the reference-dependent model based on the idea of loss
aversion studied due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), presented in Section 4 of
Chapter I 8, and the idea of mental accounting due to Thaler (1980, 1985, 1999), in
the formulation developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006), where an individual's
instantaneous utility depends not only upon her current consumption level but also
on her current reference level, to intertemporal choices. Specially, an individual's
instantaneous utility is composed of an intrinsic consumption utility and a
reference-dependent gain-loss utility for each time period. Furthermore, both
consumption and the reference level are additively separable over time periods in the
7 The concept of similarity was first introduced by Tversky (1977) and further defined by Rubinstein
(1988).
Since the influential work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the idea of reference-dependent
preferences has been applied in analysis of intertemporal decision-making, for example, see
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) and Koszegi and Rabin (2007).
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problem of intertemporal decision-making. In contrast to the existing models of
intertemporal choice, there is no time discounting and no return on saving.
While there are multiple ways of how individual reference points could be formed, in
this paper I only focus on three simple ways of reference point determination. Here, I
consider a case where, as it is common in the literature on reference-dependent
preferences, an individual's reference is either choice-set dependent or, alternatively,
choice-set independent. I also consider a hybrid reference level whereby some
components of the reference point can be choice-set dependent and others can be
choice-set independent. In this chapter, I also apply the intertemporal
reference-dependent model to explain experimental data of Rubinstein (2003), and
argue that the intertemporal reference-dependent model may offer an alternative
explanation of experimental observations by Rubinstein (2003) for some range of
parameters of the novel model.
I thus show that one can model intertemporal choice even without the assumption of
time discounting. Furthermore, in Chapter III of the present thesis I explore a more
complicated process of reference point determination, and show that a number of
intertemporal choice anomalies can be explained by the intertemporal
reference-dependent model.
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the intertemporal
reference-dependent model, introduces choice-set dependent and choice-set
independent reference points, and presents a procedure of intertemporal
decision-making. Section 3 presents an application of this model to the experimental
setup of Rubinstein (2003). Section 4 considers formation of hybrid reference points.
Summary and further directions are presented in Section 5.
2. Reference-Dependent Preferences
The intertemporal reference-dependent model presented here employs reference
points and loss aversion, which are two important concepts in behavioural economics.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that an individual's preferences are defined
over changes of wealth relative to her reference level, rather than depend merely on
the absolute level of final wealth; and individuals are more sensitive to losses than
gains; in addition, individuals reveal diminishing sensitivity for both gains and losses,
which gives an S-shaped utility function that is concave over domain of gains and
convex over domain of losses.
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2.1. Intertemporal Reference-Dependent Model
The model presented here is based on the linear formulation used in Koszegi and
Rabin (2006). Here, an individual's utility in each time period depends not only upon
the consumption of an item but also on the deviation between consumption and her
reference level that is her anticipation of outcomes. Importantly, here, there is no
interest rate on savings and individuals value time equally (i.e. no time discounting).
Specifically, a person receives an intrinsic consumption utility m{ct), and a
reference-dependent gain-loss utility g{cl\rl) in each time period, in which ct is
her per-period consumption level and rt is her per-period reference level. Time is
discrete, t e 1,2,...T, and an individual's per-period utility could be written as:
u(ct,rt) =m(ct)+ g(c,\rt), t e \,2,...T.
In each time period, the gain-loss utility function depends upon the difference
between the utility of consumption and the utility of reference point, m(ct)-m(rt).
Therefore the gain-loss utility could be specified asg(c,|r,)=//(m(c,)-m(r()), where
the function ju captures loss aversion, and satisfies the following properties
originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and further specified by
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), which include a kink at zero:
AO. ju(x) is continuous for all x, and twice differentiable for x ^ 0, and //(o) = 0.
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Al. p(x) is strictly increasing in X.
A2. If y > x > 0, then //(y) + ju(- y) < //(x) + //(— jc).
A3. //"(x)<0 for x>0 and //"(x)>0 for x<0.
A4. ^P) = x > 1, where p'+(o)= limv_0 p(\x\) and ju'_(6) = limr^0 //"(-|x|).
a(o)
Property AO and Al imply that u(ct,rt) is increasing in ct and decreasing in rt.
Property A2 and A4 capture the concept of loss aversion, in a sense that losses are
more important than gains, which imply that individuals are risk-averse in the
domain of gains but risk-seeking in the domain of losses.
In addition, the consumption utility function m(x) satisfies the following properties:
BO. m(x) is continuous for all x, and twice differentiable for x > 0, m{0) = 0.
Bl. m(x) is strictly increasing.
B2. m (x)< 0 for all x.
Furthermore, both the intrinsic consumption utility and the reference-dependent
gain-loss utility are separable additive over time dimension 9 , such that
9 Both consumption and gain-loss could be defined over hedonic dimensions. For example, the
consumption utility from watching a movie would be composed of utility from the following four hedonic
dimensions: acting, plot, cinematography, and music. In this context, two goods are perfect substitutes if
they are hedonically similar to an individual. Here I extend the standard reference-dependent model,
and assume that both consumptions and reference levels are K-dimensional consumption sequences in
each time period; hence consumption c- = ■••• c« )e >Ji 1 and reference level r' =(ru,r„,....rD)e^':
Therefore, a given consumption bundle (reference level) provides k-dimensional hedonic value in each
period of time, which could be represented by a KxT matrix. For instance, a consumption bundle of
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m (0=1 iYi (c[) 9 where is the consurnption time period of 15 Bnd
g(c|r) = r.(jti(m(ct) -m{rt)), where rt is the reference level at time period of t.




Thus, an individual would prefer La={xa,ta) to Lb=(xb,tb) in a situation with
two intertemporal options, for example, if and only if U(xa,ra )>U(xb,rb).
2.2. Choice-set Dependent vs. Choice-set Independent Reference Points
The reference points are important component in reference-dependent model. As
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point out, the reference levels are not necessarily
constant. Although in most circumstances the reference point coincides with the
individual's current level of wealth, the reference level might also be either a
particular past consumption level or a future expected level of wealth that is different
from the current one. Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999), and Breiter, Aharon,
Kahneman, Dale, and Shizgal (2001) (see also Koszegi and Rabin (2006)) document
that an individual's expectations of outcome are significantly more important than
c„ c„,, clf„2 c
C2, Cll+l C21.2 c
C„., c„.2 c
c., c..„ c.,., cwatching four movies in four time periods would be represented by the following matrix
in which each column presents a movie with four hedonic consumption values in each time period, and
each row of the matrix presents one hedonic consumption dimension, namely, acting, plot,
cinematography, and music. Specially, a monetary consumption bundle provides a one-dimensional
hedonic value at each period of time.
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previous consumption status on determination of reference level. For example, an
individual would be less happy with a 5% increase in her income when she expected
a 10% one, on the other hand, she would experience more happiness with a 15%
raise in income compared to her expectation of a 10% increase.
In the intertemporal setting, time preferences might be affected by current
expectation of future outcomes. Because individual's reference points are very
difficult to observe and estimate, there are no clear evidences of reference point
formation in the literature on reference-dependent preferences. Based on the idea of
mental accounting - that according to different "mental account" individuals may
treat monetary expenditures as different types - studied by Thaler (1980, 1985, and
1999), to fix the reference point, we make following assumptions:
Assumption CI: The reference point is the consumption bundle which offers the
highest consumption value at the earliest available date.
For example, apply different references to each pair of intertemporal options, and in
a situation with two pairs ofmonetary intertemporal options, and each option involve
four time periods, A:(a1,a2,a3,a4) and B\{bx,b2,b3,b4) , C:(c,,c2,c3,c4) and
D:(d],d2,d3,d4), in which a, > bx > c, > dx . Assumption C1 implies that if an
individual faces a choice between a pair of intertemporal options A and B, her
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reference level is determined by option^:(a,,a2,<z3,a4) as this option that offers
higher consumption at the earliest date, but when faced with the pair of intertemporal
options C and C, her reference level is C: {cx, c2, c3, c4 ).
Assumption C2: The reference point is choice-set independent, with the reference
level of a monetary consumption bundle is X :(x:,x2,...,xt,...) , for xt>0
t e 1,2,...T.
For the above-mentioned example, Assumption C2 implies that same reference point
will be applied to both pairs of intertemporal options, because the reference level is
choice-set independent as X :(xl,x2,xi,x4). I also consider the following special
case ofAssumption C2.
Assumption C2': The reference point is choice-set independent, and involves an
immediate payoff in today and zero payoff thereafter, e.g. the reference ofa monetary
consumption bundle is, X : (x,0,...,0,...), for x > 0.
In the above-mentioned example, Assumption C2' implies that the reference level is
choice-set independent as X: (x,0,0,0) for both pairs of intertemporal options and is
a special case of Assumption C2. The Assumption C2' may capture the reference
points of subjects in economic experiments, as they are typically recruited with a
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promise of an immediate payment (and nothing afterwards). For example, if subjects
were recruited using an advertisement that stating that "on average, subjects earn
£25", their reference point may be (£25,0,0,0).
In the next sub-section, examples would be offered to explain how the
reference-dependent model works in intertemporal circumstances. To simplify
analyses and without losing generality, a linear modification of the intertemporal
reference-dependent model with Assumption CI and C2' will be applied in example
1 in the next sub-section.
2.3. A Procedure of Intertemporal Decision-Making
In this sub-section, the procedure of intertemporal decision-making would be
analysed. Let A:(at,a2,a3,a4) and B:{bx,b2,b3,b4) be a pair of monetary
intertemporal options, in which a, >bx, and >- and ~ denote strict preference and
indifference, respectively. Assumption CI implies that the reference point for this
pair of intertemporal options is A:(a],a2,a3,a4), hence an individual who follows
Assumption CI would have following time preferences:
A> <B iff u(A\A) = Yjm(al)>=<u(B\A)=Yjm(bt)+YsS(b\at)-
t=i r=i i=\
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On the other hand, Assumption C2 implies that the reference point for this pair of
intertemporal options is X:(x,,x2,x3,x4) , hence an individual who follows
Assumption C2 would have following time preferences:
A> <B iff u(A\x)=Yjm{at)+YJg{a\x)>=<u{B\x)=Yjm{bt)+YJgip,\x)-
1=1 i=i 1=1 1=1
To simplify further analysis, assume that m(xl) = xt, ju(xt )~r]xt, //(- x,) = -Arjxt,
where x, > 0,7 > 0 , and A>\. In addition, assume the function p. is identical for
each time period, hence At = A and r/, =rj.
Example 1: Let two pairs of intertemporal options be A : (0,a,0,0) and B : (0,0,0,&),
C:(0,0,c,0) and D:(0,0,0,j), in which 0 <a <c <d <b . Assume a group of
individuals are required to choose the favourite option from either the pair of options
A and B or the pair of options C and D.
If an individual follows the Assumption CI, in the first pair of options the reference
level is A:(0,a,0,0), and then the utility of option A is given by
UA (c, r) = UA ((0, a,0,0)|(0, a,0,0))=m(a)= a,
and the utility of option B is given by
UB (c,r)= UB ((0,0,0, £)|(0, a,0,0)) = m(b) + g(o|a) ■+ g(&|o)
— b — Arja + r/b
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In addition, applying Assumption CI in the second pair of options implies that the
reference level is C : (0,0,c,0) and the utility of option C is given by
Uc (c, r) = Uc ((0,0, c,0|(0,0, c,0)) = m{c) = c,
and the utility of option D is given by
UD{c,r)= UD ((0,0,0, d )(0,0, c,0)) = m(d)+ g(o|c)+ g(<i|o)
= d - Arjc + pd
1st • ^>ndpair 2 pair
— >X b>0 A<B C<D
c
rj> 0 A<B C<D
?7 >0 A<B C <D
b d b-a





















Hence, the individual would prefer A to B if and only if r/>——— > 0, prefer B to
Aa-b
A if and only if ——— > rj > 0, and be indifferent between A and B if and only if
Aa-b
ij = ——— > 0, where A> — >\. On the other hand, the individual would always
Aa-b a
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prefer B to A if — > A>\ for all range of tj>0 . Similarly, the individual would
a
d — c
prefer C to D if and only if 77 > > 0, prefer D to C if and only if
Ac-d
d — c d — c
> 77 > 0, and be indifferent between C and D if and only if 77 = > 0,
Ac — d Ac — d
where A > — > 1. On the other hand, the individual would always prefer D to C if
c
— >A> 1 for all range of 77 >0. Following Assumption CI, her preferences over
c
these two intertemporal options are summarized in the Table 2 according to different
rang ofparameters of the gain-loss utility.
Thus, following the Assumption CI, the individual's time preferences when
presented with a choice over intertemporal options zl:(0,a,0,0) and B:(0,0,0,6),
will be different from her time preferences when presented with options
C : (0,0, c,0) and D:(0,0,0,d).
On the other hand, if the individual follows the Assumption C2', then the reference
point is same for all intertemporal options, which is fixed at X: (x,0,...,0,...), in
which x > 0. According to the Assumption C2' the utility of option A in the first
pair of choices is given by
UA (c, r) = UA ((0, a,0,0)|(x,0,0,0))= 777(a) + g(o|x)+ g(a|o)
= a - Apx + r/a
and the utility of option B is given by
UB (c, r) = UB ((0,0,0,b)(x,0,0,6))= m(b) + g(o|x)+g(^|o)
= b-Arjx + pb
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In addition, applying Assumption C2' in the second pair of intertemporal options
implies that the utility of option C is given by
Uc(c,r) = Uc ((0,0, c,0)j(x,0,0,0))= m(c)+ g(o|x)+ g(c|o)
5
= c - Apx + 77c
and the utility ofoption D is given by
UD (c, r) = UD ((0,0,0, d j(x,0,0,0)) = m(d)+ g(o|x)+ g(</|o)
= d-A.T]x + rid
Since all four options involve a zero payoff today, which is captured by the first
number of each option, an individual would suffer losses on the earliest date in each
option. Therefore, she would always prefer B to A as long as b> a, and would also
always prefer D to C as long as d > c, for 77 > 0 and A > 1.
In the example 1, when facing intertemporal choices, a group of individuals with
different rules of reference point determination would have different time preferences.
In addition, if individuals' reference levels are choice-set dependent, the
intertemporal reference-dependent model would also predict heterogeneous time
preferences among individuals that would vary according to the parameters of the
gain-loss utility. Based on the analysis of the above-mentioned example, the
intertemporal reference-dependent model may offer an alternative explanation of the
experimental observation of Rubinstein (2003), which will be presented in the next
section.
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3. Application of Reference-Dependent Model to
Rubinstein (2003)
Over the last two decades, a number of alternatives of the exponential discounted
utility model have been developed by generalizing assumptions of either the time
discounting function or the instantaneous utility function, (for example, hyperbolic
discounting theory that successfully describes the diminishing discount rates). In a
recent study, Rubinstein (2003) (see Section 3.2 of Chapter I of this thesis)
introduced experimental observations, which challenge descriptive validity of not
only the standard exponential discounted utility model but the hyperbolic discounting
theory with an increasing and concave instantaneous utility function as well.
For example, in the study of Rubinstein (2003), subjects were asked (in the year of
2002) to choose the favourite option from either the question 1 or the question 2 in
the following two questions:
Question 1.
"A: Receiving $467.00 on June 17th 2004. => A: (0,467,0,0)
50
Chapter II. Intertemporal Reference-Dependent Model
"B: Receiving $607.07 on June 17th 2005. " => B : (0,0,0,607.07)
Question 2.
"C: Receiving 467.00 on June 16th 2005." => C: (0,0,467,0)
"D: Receiving 467.39 on June 17th 2005. " => D: (0,0,0,467.39)
In each of above brackets, the first number presents the monetary payoff on today,
th
the second number presents the monetary payoff on June 17 2004, and third number
th
presents the monetary payoff on June 16 2005, and the final number presents the
th
monetary payoff on June 17 2005. Experimental findings reveal that subjects tend
to prefer B to A but C to D. This is inconsistent with prediction of not only the
standard exponential discounted utility model but also the hyperbolic discounting
theory with an increasing and concave instantaneous utility function, since the
standard exponential discounted utility model would predict that an individual may
either prefer A to B and C to D or prefer B to A and D to C, and the hyperbolic
discounting theory with an increasing and concave instantaneous utility function
would predict that she may also prefer A to B and D to C, but both models predict
that she would never prefer B to A and C to D at the same time (for a more complete
analysis see Section 3.2 of Chapter I ).
Is the similarity approach the only explanation of subjects' behaviour in the
Rubinstein's experiment? I suggest that the intertemporal reference-dependent model
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may offer an alternative explanation of observations reported by Rubinstein (2003)l0.
Following Assumption CI, in the first pair of options an individual's reference would
be A : (0,467,0,0), therefore receiving $607.07 on 17th 2005 would involve a loss on
17th 2004 but a significant gain on 17th 2005. On the other hand, in the second pair of
options her reference would be C: (0,0,467,0), therefore receiving $467.39 on 17th
2005 would involve a loss on 16th 2005 but a small gain on 17th 2005.
Following Assumption C2', an individual's reference level would be choice-set
independently fixed at X: (x,0,0,0), hence both options involve a loss on today but
receiving $607.07 on 17th 2005 would involve a significant gain on 17th 2005, which
is more than receiving $467 on 17th 2004 in the first question; in the second question,
both options involve a loss on today but receiving $467.39 on 17th 2005 involve
more gains than receiving $467 on 16th 2005.
Therefore, the experiment of Rubinstein (2003) may be understood using the
example 1 of Section 2. Following the Assumption CI, individuals' time preferences
associated with different range of parameter A and ?/ are summarized in Table 3,
in which a-c = $467, b = $607.07 , and d = $467.39 . Following the Assumption
CI, in some range of parameter A and ij, the intertemporal reference-dependent
10 Rubinstein's experimental results can also be explained by the fact that people tend to have
difficulties of computing results on a one-year investment (Question 1) and a one-day investment
(Question 2) - I thank Joe Swierzbinski for pointing this to me.
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model would predict that an individual would prefer option B in the first question but
option C in the second question, which may imply that loss aversion would force
subjects to require a significant compensation for delaying any consumption, which
is consistent with prediction of similarity procedure.
On the other hand, if we follow the Assumption C2', the intertemporal
reference-dependent model would predict that an individual would always prefer B
in the first question and D in the second pair of intertemporal options, which is











= c = 467 , b = 607.07, and
discounting theory.
Ql
— >/L T}>0 A<B
77 > 0 A<B
r}>0 A<B
b . d b-a























Table 3. Parameter range consistent with Assumption C1, here A > 1, a
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d = 467.39.
In summary, the intertemporal reference-dependent model may offer an alternative
explanation of observations by Rubinstein (2003), and may also offer an explanation
of the heterogeneity among subjects.
4. Hybrid Reference Points
In Section 2, two kinds of rule of determining reference level are presented, namely
choice-set dependent level and choice-set independent reference level. In addition, in
Section 2, an example is offered to explain how these two kinds of reference level
may work. Apart from the choice-set dependent and choice-set independent reference
levels, individual may follow a hybrid rule of determining reference level, e.g.
mixing the choice-set dependent and choice-set independent reference levels up. For
example, in the example 1, the choice-set dependent reference level of the first pair
of intertemporal options is A: (0,a,0,0) and the choice-set independent reference
level is fixed at X: (x,0,0,0,). If the individual forms a "maximum hybrid"
expectation, the hybrid reference level is HMax :(x,n,0,0). If an individual follows
maximum rule of hybrid reference level, she would tend to experience losses.
For example, following the above hybrid assumption, the utility of option A in
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example 1 would be given as:
UA (c, r) = UA ((0, a,0,0)(*, a,0,0))=m{a)+ g(o|x)
9
-a- Apx
and the utility of option B is given by
UB(c,r) = f/B((0,0,0,^))(x,a,0,0))= m(b)+ g(o|x)+ g"(o|a)+ g(h|o)
= b - Ar/x - A,rja + rjb
Therefore, the individual would prefer A to B if and only if 77 >——— > 0, prefer B
Aa-b
to A if and only if ——— > rj > 0, and be indifferent between A and B if and only if
Aa-b
V — ~ ~r > 0 5 where A > — > 1. On the other hand, the individual would always
Aa-b a
prefer B to A if — > A > 1 for all range of 77 > 0. Similarly, the individual would
a
d — c
prefer C to D if and only if 77 > > 0 , prefer D to C if and only if
Ac-d
d — c d — c
> 77 > 0, and be indifferent between C and D if and only if 77 = > 0,
Ac-d Ac — d
where A > — > 1. On the other hand, the individual would always prefer D to C if
c
— > A > 1 for all range of 77 > 0. This result is same as the prediction of applying
c
the Assumption CI in Section 2.
The more generalized rule ofmaximum hybrid reference level is summarized in the
following assumption:
Assumption HI : In each time period, in the case of two intertemporal options A and
B, the reference points would be rkt =max(akt,bkt,xkt), where akl is an element of
the intertemporal option A, bkt is an element ofthe intertemporal option B, and xkl
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is an element ofchoice-set independent reference level.
With this type of reference points, subjects would tend to experience losses. Here,
optimistic expectations lead to lower welfare.
On the other hand, the individual may follow the rule of "minimum hybrid"
reference levels, which is given in the following assumption:
Assumption H2: In each time period, in the case of two intertemporal options A and
B, the reference points would be rkt = m\r\(akt,bkt,xkt), where akt is an element of
the intertemporal option A, bkl is an element ofthe intertemporal option B, and xkt
is an element ofchoice-set independent reference level.
With this type of reference points, subjects would tend to avoid experience of losses.
Here pessimistic expectations lead to higher welfare.
In the example 1, according to the Assumption C2', the choice-set independent
reference level is fixed at X :(x,0,0,0), hence the hybrid reference level would be
HMin : (0,0,0,0). Then utility of option A would be given as:
UA (c, r) = UA ((0, a,0,0)|(0,0,0,0)) =m(a)+ g(a|o)
= a + r/a
and the utility of option B is given by
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UB (c,r) = UB ((0,0,0,b)(0,0,0,0))=m(b)+ g(fc|o)
= b + r/b
If an individual follows the special rule of "minimum hybrid" reference points in the
example 1, she would always prefer option B to A as long as b> a, for 77 > 0 and
A > 1, which is the same as the prediction of applying choice-set independent
reference points Assumption C2' in Section 2, except she would experience more
gains. Following the rule of "minimum hybrid" reference points, the individual
would always prefer D to C as long as d > c, for r/> 0 and A > 1, which is same
as the prediction of applying choice-set independent reference points Assumption C2'
in Section 2.
5. Summary and Further Directions
This chapter suggests an alternative approach of how individuals make choices over
time. The proposed model is based on the idea of loss aversion suggested by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and the idea of mental accounting suggested by
Thaler (1980, 1985, and 1999). Here, an individual's utility is composed of an
intrinsic consumption utility and a gain-loss utility in each time period. In this model,
individual's choices depend on individuals' expectation ofhow much money she may
earn. I show that the reference-dependent model can be used to explain intertemporal
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choices even without the assumption of time discounting. In addition, the proposed
intertemporal reference-dependent model has been applied to experimental
observations of Rubinstein (2003). Here, if the individual's reference point is
choice-set dependent by the bundle which offers highest payoff at the earliest date,
for some parameters of individual's gain-loss utility, the predictions are consistent
with Rubinstein's (2003) experimental observations. If, instead, individual's
reference point is choice-set independent, the prediction coincides with one of
possible predictions of hyperbolic discounting theory.
Since there is little evidence of how subjects form their reference points in each time
period, we are agnostic about the true reference-generating process. While Koszegi
and Rabin (2007) propose a model via reference points are determined in what they
call a "personal equilibrium", further research on the reference generating process is
needed.
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Can Loss Aversion Explain
Intertemporal Choice Anomalies?11
Abstract: In this chapter, I extend the intertemporal model of reference-dependent
preferences of Chapter II, where individual is uncertain about her future
circumstances. Here, an individual's instantaneous utility is composed of an intrinsic
consumption utility and a reference-dependent gain-loss utility, and her reference
levels follow a random walk process. While the model does not explicitly include
time discounting and return on saving, it nevertheless may offer an alternative
explanation of present bias and negative time preference (future bias). In addition,
the intertemporal reference-dependent model may also offer an alternative
explanation of dynamically inconsistent preferences over time.
11
I would like to thank Jozsef Sakovics for useful and constructive suggestions.
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1. Introduction
Intertemporal decision-making is important and ubiquitous human activity. To
explain how people make choices over time, economists have been using the
exponential discounted utility model of Samuelson (1937), where an individual's
preferences between two consumption prospects should merely depend upon the
absolute time interval that separates them. However, in the past few decades, this
model has received substantial criticism, and as the result, a large number of
alternative theories of intertemporal choice have been developed by economists (see
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002)).
In this chapter, I extend the intertemporal model of reference-dependent preferences
of Chapter II, in which an individual's instantaneous utility is composed of an
intrinsic consumption utility and a reference-dependent gain-loss utility for each time
period to a situation where individual's reference levels follow a random walk
process to capture uncertainty about future circumstances. Furthermore, both
consumption and the reference level are additively separable over time periods in the
problem of intertemporal decision-making. In contrast to the existing models of
intertemporal choice, there is no time discounting and no return on saving.
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There are many reasons why an individual may face uncertainty about her future
circumstance, and three classes of reasons are worthy of attention. The first class of
reasons is psychological - for example, individual's reference point may depend on
her emotional state or mood. Alternatively, a change in the reference point may
represent a change in the individual's taste. The second class of reasons is economic.
Suppose, for example, that an individual's reference point is simply a standard of
living that this individual aspires to achieve. The expenditure required to achieve this
standard of living may depend on the state of the economy (e.g. on whether the
economy is expanding or contracting). The third class of reasons is social. For
example, suppose, again, an individual aspires to achieve some standard of living,
but this standard of living may depend on what do other people consume, or on
consumption fashions, or on some other social factors.
As one of the major results, with no time discounting and no return on saving, the
intertemporal model of reference-dependent preferences may offer an alternative
explanation of present bias and negative time preference (future bias). Another major
result in this chapter is that with no time discounting and no return on saving, the
intertemporal reference-dependent model may also offer an alternative explanation of
dynamically inconsistent preferences over time.
Hyperbolic discounting model, first studied by Strotz (1956) and further advanced by
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Laibson (1997), is the most influential alternative to the neoclassical theory of
intertemporal decision-making. Hyperbolic discounting theory provides a general
mathematical expression of psychology for intertemporal decision-making, and
captures that an individual's preferences are dynamically inconsistent over time. For
example, hyperbolic discounting theory predicts that an individual would prefer to
receive $ 100 right now rather than to receive $ 110 tomorrow, but at the same time,
she would also prefer to receive $110 in one year and one day from now rather than
to receive $100 in one year from now.
Experimental evidence has not only revealed that an individual's intertemporal
preferences are inconsistent over time but also that in some circumstances an
individual would prefer to delay a given amount of consumption. In other words,
individuals would have negative time preference (i.e. future bias), which could not be
explained by either the standard exponential discounted utility model or the
hyperbolic discounting theory (see Koopmans et al (1964), Olson and Bailey (1981),
Loewenstein and Prelec (1991), and Lowenstein and Sicherman (1991)).
Reference-dependent preferences were first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), in which an individual's preferences are defined over changes of wealth
relative to her reference level; individuals care more about losses than gains;
individuals reveal diminishing sensitivity for both gains and losses, which means that
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an S-shaped utility function that is concave over the domain of gains and convex
over the domain of losses with a kink at zero. Since the influential work of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the model of reference-dependent preferences has
been applied in analysis of intertemporal decision-making, for example, see
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) and Koszegi
and Rabin (2007).
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the intertemporal
reference-dependent model, and the random walk process of reference level that
captures the uncertainty about future circumstances; Section 3 is devoted to
discussion of an individual's preferences for delaying an indivisible consumption
value over time, in which an individual would have present bias or future bias;
Section 4 describes how her intertemporal preferences are dynamically inconsistent
over time, where her preferences over two different consumption values would
change when both are delayed by one time period; further direction and conclusion
are given in Section 5.
2. Reference-Dependent Preferences
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that an individual's preferences are defined
over changes of wealth relative to her reference level, rather than depend merely on
the absolute level of final wealth; and individuals care more about losses than gains;
in addition, individuals reveal diminishing sensitivity for both gains and losses,
which means that an S-shaped utility function that is concave over the domain of
gains and convex over the domain of losses with a kink at zero. In other words,
individuals are risk-averse in gains but risk-loving in losses.
In this section, I develop a reference-dependent model of intertemporal
decision-making, in which an individual's per-period utility is composed of an
intrinsic consumption utility and a reference-dependent gain-loss utility (in the
formulation appearing in Koszegi and Rabin (2006)), and where an individual's
reference levels follow a stochastic process, which captures uncertainty about future
circumstance.
2.1 Loss Aversion
Suppose there is no interest rate on savings and individuals value time equally (i.e.
no time discounting). An individual's per-period utility is composed of an intrinsic
consumption utility m{cl) and a utility from the reference-dependent gain-loss
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sensation g(c,\rt) that measures the effect of difference between consumption and
her reference level. Therefore her per-period utility could be represented by a
function
u(cfrt) =mict) + g{c,\r,),
where ct is her consumption level and rt is her reference level in each time
periods, te\,2,...,T.
In the per-period utility function, the gain-loss utility depends upon the difference
between the utility of consumption and the utility of the reference point,
m{ct )-m(rt). Specifically, the gain-loss utility could be represented by
where the function //, which is identical for each time period, captures loss aversion,
and satisfies properties, which are originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and further specified by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), as following:
AO. //(x) is continuous for all x, and twice differentiable for x ^ 0, and //(o) = 0.
Al. p(x) is strictly increasing in x.
A2. If y > x > 0, then /u(y) + ju(- y) < /r(x) + //(- x).
A3. /u"(x)< 0 for x>0 and //"(x)>0 for x<0.
A4- = 2 > 1, where /^(o)=lim^0//'(jx|) and /rl(o)=limx^0/r'(-|x|).
A-(0)
Property AO and Al imply that u(c;,r() is increasing in ct and decreasing in rt.
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Property A2 and A4 capture the concept of loss aversion, in other words, losses are
more important than gains, which imply that individuals are risk-averse in the
domain of gains but risk-seeking in the domain of losses. The intrinsic consumption
utility function m(c) is a monotonic increasing concave function as described by
neo-classical economic theory.
Furthermore, both the intrinsic consumption utility and the reference-dependent
19
gain-loss utility are separable addictive over T . Hence, the overall utility of a
consumption bundle could be written as following function:
T T
u(c>r) = Yum(<ct) +X )-m(rt)). (1)
/=i /=i
For simplicity, throughout this chapter, we will consider the following linear
formulation:
Intrinsic consumption utility m{xt) = xt, -s
Gains ju(xl) = pxt, for xt > 0, r/ > 0 , and A > 1 > ^
Lossesju(-xt) = -Arjxt, for xt >0,77 >0, and A> 1.
12
Both consumption and reference levels could be defined over 9?* . In other words, a given
consumption bundle provides K-dimensional hedonic value in each time period, such as colour, taste,
etc. A monetary measured consumption bundle merely provides one-dimensional hedonic value in each
time period.
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Diagram 2. The linear formulation of gain-loss utility p(x)
Notice that the function ju is identical for each time period, hence At = A and
rjt=rj. In other words, an individual has constant sensitivity about losses over
time.
Here, as an individual exhibits loss aversion, delaying a given amount of
consumption value would involve losses in the earlier time periods. On the other
hand, postponing consumption would be acceptable if it provides enough gains to
compensate earlier losses.
2.2 Changing Reference Points
Ryder and Heal (1973) proposed that an individual's current reference points would
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change with her previous consumption and reference point in a dynamic
utility-maximization framework. Specifically, an individual's preference points
would change with the function rt = act_x + (l -a)rt_x, where a e (0,l) measure the
speed at which the reference points adjust in response to her most recent
consumption. Based on the work of Ryder and Heal (1973), Bowman, Minehart, and
Rabin (1999) apply the reference changing function in a two-period
consumption-saving model and reveal that when an individual's consumption level
captures uncertainty about future incomes, her responses to uncertainty by increasing
or decreasing her current consumption level are different.
Mellers, et al (1999), and Breiter, et al (2001) (see also Koszegi and Rabin (2006))
document that an individual's reference level is significantly dependent on her
expectations of future outcomes. Hence, when an individual faces an intertemporal
choice, her reference level would also be responsive to uncertainty about future
circumstances. For example, information about our future health circumstances may
not change our expected incomes, but may affect our current consumption decision.
In an intertemporal setting, an individual's current choices may be affected by her all
possible realized future reference points, which represent uncertainty of future
circumstance. By recognizing this, the individual may incorporate effects of
randomly realized reference points into her current decision-making. To simplify the
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analysis of effects of randomly realized reference points on an individual's current
decision-making, in this chapter, there are only three possible reference levels in the
next time period conditional on her current reference level and all information about
future circumstances are received in the current time period and imminently captured
in the stochastic process. Thus the individual's future reference levels would increase,
decrease, or remain in the same level as the previous period. This reference
generating process could either be an internal process - for example, an individual's
anticipations, and thus her reference level, may be optimistic or pessimistic,
depending on her mood upon waking up in the morning. Alternatively, her reference
level is the expenditure required to purchase certain basket of goods, and it thus may
change because the prices of goods may change.
Let rt_j be the reference level in the time period of t -1. Therefore, an individual's
reference level in the time period of t could be represented by following probability
functions:
prob{rt = rt_x —a) = p,
prob(rt=rt_x) = \-p-q,
prob(rt = rt_x +a) = q,
(3)
where a > 0, which is the magnitude of reference level reduced or increased
per-period. In addition, the initial reference point rx is exogenously determined. In
other word, an individual's reference is generated by an initial reference and
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anticipations about future. Probabilities capture the uncertainty of future
circumstances. The random walk process over three time periods is represented in
Diagram 3.
Diagram 3. The random walk process over three time periods, where Prob[rt = rl_l-cz)= p,
prob(rt = rtA ) = 1 - p - q ■ and prob(rt = r,_, + or) = q ■
For example, the anticipations of future circumstances may lead the individual's
reference level to increase, decrease or remain at the previous level with equal
probability in the second time period. In other words, p = 1- p - q = q = -^, where
prob{r2 = rx - a) = p , prob{r2 = r,) = 1 - p - q , and prob(r2 = rx+a) = q . An
individual, whose objective is to maximize her expected lifetime utility, faces two
intertemporal options: A:(c,0), and option B: ((), c), where c = rx. With the linear
formulation previously described, utilities from two options are as following:
The utility from option A:
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E[Ua (r, ,c1,r2,c2)]=ra(c1)+ g(c1|r1)+ E[m(c2 ) + g(c2|r2)]
= m(c)+ g(c\rx)+ ^(m(0)+ g(o|r, - a))+ ^(w(o)+ g(o|r,))+ ^(m(o) + g(o|r, + a))
= c-^7r, -^A^r, +a)-^Xrt{rx-a)
= c — Ar/rx
The utility from option B:
E[Ub (q, c, ,r 2, c2)]= m{cx)+ g(c, | rx)+E[m{c2)+ g(c2\r2)]
= m(0)+ g(o|q )+^(m{c)+ g[c\r, -a))+ ^{m{c) + g(c\r{))+ ~(m(c)+ g(c|r, + a))
= -Xr)rx +^-c + ^(c- hr]cc)+ ^{c + ria)
= c-krirx - \^X.rja + ~77a
Since A > 1, therefore e[ua]- E[Ub\ = - ^rja > 0, the utility from option A
is higher than that from option B. An individual who maximizes her expected
lifetime utility would prefer option A to option B. In other words, when uncertainty
about tomorrow involves equal probability of increasing or reducing her reference
levels, she would strictly prefer to enjoy consumption today rather than delaying it
for tomorrow. Intuitively, giving up the guaranteed indivisible monetary consumption
today would incur a large amount of losses today, which could not be compensated
by receiving the guaranteed indivisible monetary consumption value tomorrow even
if her reference level tomorrow would probably be lower than that of today.
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3. Intertemporal Preferences over Constant
Consumption
In this section, I will apply the above intertemporal reference-dependent model with
stochastic reference points to explore an individual's intertemporal choice.
Importantly, I assume here that there is no interest rate and no time discounting.
3.1 Two Period Model
We first consider an individual's intertemporal decisions over two time periods when
she faces an amount of guaranteed indivisible monetary consumption value in either
time period. Therefore, she could either consume this indivisible consumption value
in the first time period (today hereafter) and nothing in the second time period
(tomorrow thereafter), or vice versa. In the intertemporal context, these two
intertemporal options could be represented as: option A: (c,0), and option B: (0,c).
Any uncertainty is resolved in the second period caused by news or information
about tomorrow, which would affect the individual's anticipations of tomorrow, and
directly affects her reference levels of tomorrow. Hence, there are three possible
reference levels of tomorrow, prob{r2 = rx - a) = p, prob{r2 = rl) = l- p - q , and
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prob{r2 = rx + a) = q , where a > 0 that represents the magnitude of reference level
decreased or increased by news about future. In addition, since consumption could
not be negative in either period, it is reasonable to assume that the reference levels in
the second time period would not be negative, hence rx - a > 0 .
An individual's purpose is to maximize her expected lifetime utility, and her
expected lifetime utility is given by:
E[u(rx, c, ,r2,c2)] = m(cx)+ g(cx |r,)+ E{m(c2)+ g(c2 \r2)},
where ct is her consumption in each period and rt is her reference level in each
period, t e (l,2).
Let us consider the earlier example, where the individual's reference level would
increase, decrease or remain as the previous level with equal probability in the
second time period. The utility from option A:
E[Ua (r,, c, ,r2, c2)] = m(cx ) + g(cl\rl)+ E[m(c2 )+g(c2|r2)]
= m(c) + g(c\rx)+^(m(0) + g(o|r, - a)) + ^(m(o)+ ))+i(/w(o) + g(o|r, + a))
= c--Aqri --Aq(rx +a)--Arj(rx -a)
= c- Xqrx
The utility from option B:
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E[ua (l ,c,,r2,c2 )] = m(cx )+g(c,|r,)+ E[m(c2 ) + g(c2 \r2)]
= m(0) + g(o|q)+ j (m(c) + g(c\rx -a))+- (m{c) + g(c\rx))■+ j(m{c) + g(c\rx + a))
= -Arjrl +-c + ^(c-/l77or) + i(c + /7«)
= c- Arjrx — ^Arja + \>rla
The gains from option A is zero since the consumption level is equal to her initial
reference level, and the gains from option B is —rja that comes from difference
between consumption level and her possible pessimistic reference level rx-a,
hence option B provides more gains than option A. At the same time, losses from
option A is - Arjrx, and losses from option B is - Aprx - ^Arja , in which - jArja
comes from difference between consumption level and her optimistic reference level
rx + a, hence option B also provides more losses than option A. If the individual's
reference level in the second time period increases, decreases or remains at the
previous-period level with equal probability, the individual would prefer option A to
option B since the amount by which gains outweight losses is higher with option A
rather than with option B. Hence the individual would maximize her expected
lifetime utility by choosing the intertemporal option, which, in fact, minimizes her
expected lifetime combination of gains and losses in terms of absolute value.
We now turn to the more general case when reference levels may increase, decrease
or stay unchanged with unequal probabilities. All calculations for two time periods
can be found in Appendix A. Here, only a summary is presented. Diagram 4
74
Chapter IIICan Loss Aversion Explain Intertemporal Choice Anomalies?
represents the relative position of the consumption value to her possible reference
level of tomorrow, where c', c", c'", and c'v are four possible level of the
consumption value; and rx - a, rx, and rx + a are three possible reference level of
tomorrow, along with the probability p , 1 - p - q, and q respectively.
c' rx - a c" rx c1" rx + a c'v
C
p 1 -p-q q
Diagram 4. The range of consumption value for two-period model, where prob(it = rt_x -a)= p,
proh(rt = rt_x)=l-p-q , and prob(rt = rt_x +a)-q .
y
When the consumption value is c = c', where < -1, the consumption value is
a
lower than the individual's pessimistic reference level of tomorrow, in which only
losses are involved in her expected lifetime utility. In other words, both options
provide zero gains, and e[ua ] = e[ub ] for all parameters of probability. Therefore,
an individual would be indifferent between two intertemporal options. Since the
consumption value is strictly lower than her pessimistic reference level, from either
the view of today or the view of tomorrow, two intertemporal options would involve
zero gains and incur large amount of losses, which are same in the term of expected
lifetime utility.
^ y
When the consumption value is c = c//, where -1 < L<0, the consumption
a
value is between her reference level of today and her pessimistic reference level of
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tomorrow. The individual would maximize her expected lifetime utility by choosing
the intertemporal option, which minimizes her expected lifetime combination of
gains and losses. Therefore, the option A would provide lower combination of gains
and losses in terms of absolute value than option B as long as her expected reference
level of tomorrow is possibly lower than her reference level of today. In other words,
the inequality e\ub\= p(c-rx+cc\^-\)ri>0 holds as long as p>0. In
addition, the closer the consumption value to her reference level of today, the lower
the probability of reducing reference level is when the individual prefer option A
over option B. Therefore, the individual, whose objective is to maximize her
expected lifetime utility, would always strictly prefer any given consumption value
today rather than delaying that for tomorrow if her reference level of tomorrow
would possibly decrease. Since her references depend on her anticipations about
tomorrow, from the view of tomorrow, if the realized circumstance is either at the
level of rx + a or at the level of rx, both intertemporal options incur same amount
of expected gains. Therefore, in these two circumstances, an individual would be
indifferent between these two intertemporal options. On the other hand, when a
possible pessimistic anticipation of tomorrow is involved, her expected utility would
be maximized by choosing option A, which would provide lower combination of
gains and losses in terms of absolute value than option B. Hence, when an individual
has pessimistic expectations about tomorrow with nonzero probability, she would
always prefer consumption today to tomorrow, so that the present bias arises.
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q y
When the consumption value is c = c"', where 0 < < 1, the consumption value
a
is between her reference level of today and her optimistic reference level of
tomorrow. The individual's expected lifetime utility would be maximized by
choosing the option A, which minimize her expected combination of gains and losses
in terms of absolute value as long as the ratio of the probability of reducing her
reference level to the probability of increasing her reference level is high enough. In
other words, the inequality E[ua]- e[Ub] = p(/1 -\)r/a - q(A - l)q(c - r])> 0 holds
as long as — >-——. When the consumption value is c = c'", an individual's
q a
preference over the two intertemporal options depends upon anticipations about the
future, which would increase or decrease her reference level of tomorrow. When
there is a higher ratio of the probability of reducing her reference level to the
probability of increasing her reference level, the individual would prefer to choose
the consumption today. Furthermore, the closer the consumption value to her
optimistic reference level of tomorrow, the higher the ratio is when the individual
prefers option A over option B. Intuitively, if her pessimistic reference level realizes
tomorrow, the amount of gains from consumption in a pessimistic circumstance is
higher than that in an optimistic circumstance, but still not enough to cover losses
from today. On the hand, when there is more probability to have a higher reference,
the individual would prefer to delay the consumption, since not to do so would incur
more losses tomorrow than that of today; to reduce possible losses, she would give
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up gains from today and delay the consumption to tomorrow. Therefore, the
individual would prefer consumption today to consumption tomorrow when the ratio
of her pessimistic reference level of tomorrow to her optimistic reference level of
tomorrow is high enough.
q y
When the consumption value is c = c'v , where 1 < , the consumption value is
a
higher than her optimistic reference level tomorrow. The individual's expected
lifetime utility would be maximized by choosing the option A, which minimize her
expected combination of gains and losses in terms of absolute value as long as the
probability of reducing her reference level is higher than the probability of increasing
her reference level. In other words, the inequality
isft/J- E\Ub ] = (p - q\x -1 )r/a > 0 holds as long as p> q. Intuitively, when the
possibility of decreasing her reference is higher, delaying consumption to tomorrow
would involve more gains as well as losses than consumption day, hence she would
prefer consumption today to consumption tomorrow.
Therefore, under the circumstance of two time periods, her preferences over these
two intertemporal options as discussed above are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose an individual's intertemporal utility function is given by (1)
and (2) where reference points are determined by (3). Suppose further that the
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individual faces a choice between option A: (c,0), and option B: (0,c). Then,
depending on the combination of the fixed consumption value and initial reference
level andparameters ofthe random walk, an individual may havefuture bias, present
bias, or may be indifference between two options. In particular,
(i). (Future Bias) An individual will have future bias when the fixed consumption
value exceeds her current reference level and her reference level has more chance to
increase rather than decrease in next time period.
(ii). (Indifference) An individual will be indifference between two options when the
fixed consumption value falls short of her pessimistic reference level of next time
period.
(iii). (Present Bias) An individual will have present bias when the fixed consumption
value falls short of her current reference level but still exceeds her pessimistic
reference level of next time period and her reference level has more chance to
decrease rather than increase in next time period.
One can find more complete text of the proposition in the Appendix A.
Notice that both the future bias and the indifference between two options could not
be explained by either exponential discounted utility model (see Section 2.1 of
Chapter I ) or the hyperbolic discounting theory (see Section 3.1 of Chapter I ). In
fact, future bias and indifference are considered to be anomalies of the intertemporal
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choice (see Section 2.2 of Chapter I ). The diagram 5 presents areas of present bias,
future bias, and indifferent preferences; the vertical axis measures the difference
between the probability of increasing her reference levels and the probability of
decreasing her reference levels; and the horizontal axis measures consumption levels.
(q-p)
3.2 Three Periods Model
Let us now consider a three periods model, in which the consumption value could be
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consumed in exactly one of three time periods, where the individual would choose
the consumption value today but nothing tomorrow and nothing the day after
tomorrow; or other wise choose consumption either tomorrow or the day after
tomorrow but nothing for other two days. In the intertemporal context, the individual
would choose among the following three intertemporal options: option A:(c,0,0),
option B: (0,c,0), and C: (0,0, c).
Following the random walk process, there are three possible reference levels of
tomorrow, with probabilities prob{r2 = rx-a) = p , proh(r2 = r,) = 1 - p - q , and
prob\r2 = rx+a) = q\ and there are five possible reference levels of the day after
tomorrow, with probabilities prob{r3 = rx - 2a) = p1 ,
prob(ri=rx-a)=2p(\-p-q) , prob(r3 = r,) = 2pq + (1 - p - q)2
prob(r3 = rx + a) = 2q(l - p - q) , prob{r2 = rx + 2a) = q2 , where a> 0 is the
magnitude by which the reference level has reduced or increased by news about
future in the random walk process.
Suppose an individual maximizes her expected lifetime utility, which is given by:
E[u(rx ,cx,r2,c2)]= m(cx) + g(cx\rx)+ E{m{c2)+g(c2\r2)+ m{c2) + g(c3\r3)},
where ct is her consumption in each period, and rt is her reference level in each
period, te(l,2,3).
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The most interesting outcome in the three-period model is that an individual's
lifetime expected utilities would be decreasing if the given amount of consumption
were delayed period by period, as well as the marginal utility of her lifetime utilities.
The calculations of results can be found in Appendix B. Here, only a summary is
presented.
Proposition 2. Suppose an individual's intertemporal utility function is given by (1)
and (2) where reference points are determined by (3). Suppose further that the
individual faces a choice between option A: (c,0,0), option B: (0,c,0), and option
C;(0,0,c). Then, depending on the combination of the fixed consumption value and
initial reference level and parameters of the random walk, an individual may have
constant marginal utility over time, increasing marginal utility over time, and
diminishing marginal utility over time over three options.
One can find more complete text of the proposition in the Appendix B
Notice that both the constant marginal utility over time and the increasing marginal
utility over time could not be explained by either exponential discounted utility
model (see Section 2.1 of Chapter I ) or the hyperbolic discounting theory (see
Section 3.1 of Chapter I ). In fact that, the standard exponential discounted utility
theory and the hyperbolic discounting theory only predict that the individual will
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have a diminishing marginal utility (see Section 2.1 and Section 3.1 ofChapter I ).
4. Intertemporal Trade-off and Dynamically
Inconsistent Preferences
In the previous section we consider the case when consumption value was constant
over time. Now we will look into the situation when the individual faces a trade-off
between smaller but earlier consumption and larger but later one. As one can see, loss
aversion may lead to a possibility of dynamically inconsistent preferences.
4.1 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences
Consider a situation when an individual is faced with a choice over two intertemporal
options, one involving a small and sooner payoff and the other involving a large but
later payoff. According to the exponential discounted utility model, an individual's
choice should depend merely on the absolute time interval separating the two options,
but independent of the date of each intertemporal option. However, experimental
studies showed that an individual's preferences over these two intertemporal options
might change when both of them are delayed by a given time periods. For example,
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in a study of Thaler (1981), an individual might prefer one apple today to two apples
tomorrow, but at the same time she might prefer two apples in 51 days to one apple
in 50 days.
Consider the following options, a choice between a consumption value c today but
nothing for tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, a consumption value c + j3
tomorrow but nothing for today and the day after tomorrow, that is A:(c,0,0) and
B: (0, c + fi,0), where p > 0 ; at the same time, a choice between the consumption
value c tomorrow but nothing for today and the day after tomorrow, and the other
consumption value c + P the day after tomorrow but nothing for today and
tomorrow, that is C:(0,c,0) and D: (0,0,c + p), where /?>(). The intertemporal
reference-dependent model predicts that the individual would have dynamically
inconsistent preference over these two consumption values when both are delayed by
one time period, such that she would prefer option A to option B, but prefer option D
to option C at the same time.
Based on the random walk generating process, there are three possible reference
levels in the second period, with probabilities, prob{r2 = rx - a) = p ,
prob{r2 = rx)= I —p-q , and prob{r2 = rx + a) = q , where a > 0 represents the
magnitude by which reference level is reduced or increased by news about the future
in the random walk process. Furthermore, there are five possible reference levels in
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the third period, with probabilities, prob{r3 = rx—2a) = p2 ,
prob(r3 = rx - a) = 2p(\-p - q) , prob(r3 = r,) = 2pq + (1 - p - qf
prob{r3 = r{ + a) = 2q(\ - p - q), prob{r3 = rx + 2a) = q2.
The individual's expected lifetime utility is given by:
E\u{rx, c, ,r2,c2)] = m{cx) + g(cx |r,)•+ E[m{c2) ■+ g(c2 \r2)■+ m(c3) + g(c} \r3 )J,
where ct is her consumption in each period, and rt is her reference level in each
period, t e (l,2,3). Furthermore, the individual's expected utilities of a given amount
of consumption value and differences between two consecutive expected utilities are
decreasing over time when the consumption value is in the neighbourhood of her
c — v c "h (3 — y
reference level of today, therefore let -1 < < ——- < 1 . The general
a a
calculations of results can be found in Appendix C. Here, only a summary is
presented.
Proposition 3. Suppose an individual's intertemporal utility function is given by (1)
and (2) where reference points are determined by (3). Suppose further that the
individual faces two set of choices: a choice between A:(c,0,0) and B:(0,c
and a choice between C: (0,c,0) and D: (0,0,c + /?), where (3 > 0. Then an
individual will have dynamically inconsistent preferences over two consumption
values (c and c + (3) when both are delayed by one more time period
(i). under certain conditions on consumption bundle and the parameters of the
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random walk, individual's preferences would be dynamically inconsistent when two
consumption values (c and c + /3) fall short of her current reference level but
still exceed her pessimistic reference level of next time period, as long as her
reference level has same chance to decrease and has less than half chance to
increase;
(ii). under certain conditions on consumption bundle and the parameters of the
random walk, individual's preference would be dynamically inconsistent when two
consumption values (c and c + J3) exceed her current reference level but still fall
short of her optimistic reference level of next time period, as long as her reference
level has more chance to decrease rather than increase.
One can find more complete text of the proposition in the Appendix C.
Intuitively, when the two consumption values are between the individual's
pessimistic reference level of tomorrow and optimistic reference level of tomorrow,
her intertemporal preferences over these two consumption values would change
when both of them are delayed for one more time period, for some range of
parameters of the random walk, hence her intertemporal preferences are dynamically
inconsistent.
Notice that dynamic inconsistency over time could not be explained by exponential
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discounted utility model (see Section 2.1 of Chapter I ). In fact that, the standard
exponential discounted utility theory only predicts the individual will have consistent
preference over time (see Section 2.1 of Chapter I ).
4.2 Intertemporal Trade-off: Choosing Tomorrow
For the sake of completeness, consider a situation, where decision will be made
tomorrow rather than today. Therefore the pair of options A and option B are
irrelevant anymore, and she will only choose between the amount of consumption
value c tomorrow but nothing for the day after, and the other amount of
consumption value c + ft the day after tomorrow but tomorrow. Then, these two
intertemporal options are: option C;(c,0) and D: (0,c + /?). Following the random
walk process, there are three possible realizations of her reference level of tomorrow,
which are r2 = rx + a , r2=rx, and r2=rx—a. Fler propose is to maximize her
expected utility conditional on her realized reference level. Conditional on each
realized reference level, the individual would prefer option C if her realized reference
levels of tomorrow are either r2 = rx, or r2=rx-a , but may prefer option D if her
realized reference levels of tomorrow is r2 - rx +a. Therefore, when the open option
is available, her preferences over the option C and option D are inconsistent with her
previous decision when those are made today, where the open option of making
87
Chapter IHCan Loss Aversion Explain Intertemporal Choice Anomalies?
decision tomorrow is not available. This may be one of reasons why people
sometimes prefer commitments as a tool of self-control, by which an individual
11
would avoid to change her mind . On the other hand, the open option of making
decision tomorrow may make an individual be better off14. The general calculations
of results can be found in Appendix D. Here, only a summary is presented.
Proposition 4. When the realized reference level of tomorrow is either her pessimistic
reference level or same as the initial reference level, the individual's would always
have present bias, as long as parameters in the same range of inconsistent
preferences as that in Proposition 3.
One can find more complete text of the proposition in the Appendix D.
In a summary, in the neighbourhood of her initial reference level, her preferences
over two consumption values c and c + f, would change when both of them are
delayed by one more time period, which is dynamically inconsistent. In addition,
when an open option of making decision tomorrow is available, her preferences over
those two consumption values would be different from those of today when her
realized reference level are either equal to or lower than her previous reference level.
If her realized reference levels are higher than her previous one, the open option may
13
For example of discussion of temptation, commitment, and self-control see Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001, 2004, and 2005).
4
For example of discussion of choosing among opportunity sets and preference for flexibility see
Kreps (1979).
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make her better off. Therefore, the individual's intertemporal preferences are
dynamically inconsistent, and that is driven by the random walk process of reference
levels and loss aversion.
5. Summary and Further Directions
In this chapter, an intertemporal reference-dependent model, in which an individual's
reference levels follow a random walk process, may offer an alternative explanation
of the present bias as well as the negative time preference (or future bias), (see
Loewenstein and Prelec (1991), Lowenstein and Sicherman (1991)). When the
consumption value is higher than the individual's pessimistic reference level of
tomorrow, she would have present bias as long as the probability of decreasing her
reference level of tomorrow is higher than the probability of increasing her reference
level of tomorrow. On the other hand, the individual would have future bias when the
consumption value is higher than her reference level of today but the probability of
decreasing her reference level of tomorrow is lower than the probability of increasing
her reference level of tomorrow.
Furthermore, in this chapter, the intertemporal reference-dependent model also
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predicts that when an individual faces two consumption values c and c + P, which
are in the neighbourhood of her reference level of today, her preferences over them
would change when both of them are delayed by one more time period. When these
two consumption values are lower than her reference level of today, her preferences
will be dynamically inconsistent as long as the probability of decreasing her
reference level of tomorrow is not zero and the probability of increasing her
reference level of tomorrow is lower than half. On the other hand, when these two
consumption values are higher than her reference level of today, her preference will
be dynamically inconsistent as long as the probability of decreasing her reference
level of tomorrow is higher than the probability of increasing her reference level of
tomorrow.
When an open option of making decision tomorrow is available, as long as her
realized reference level of tomorrow is lower than or equal to her reference level of
today, she would always prefer the small and sooner intertemporal option to the large
but later intertemporal option, which is consistent with her preferences under the
circumstance of two time periods. Therefore she would have present bias as long as
her realized reference level of tomorrow is lower than or equal to that of today.
In this chapter, an individual's reference levels follow a random walk process, but
this is not the only way that reference levels are formed. Alternatively, the
90
Chapter lHCan Loss Aversion Explain Intertemporal Choice Anomalies?
individual's reference levels could endogenously depend upon past choices and
experiences15. This is the subject of future research.
15 For example of discussion of reference levels depend upon past experiences in two time periods, see
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999).
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A Survey-Based Within-Subject Choice
Experiment on Intertemporal
Decision-Making16
Abstract: In this chapter, I explore whether subjects' behaviour in a survey-based
within-subject choice experiment is consistent with a number of existing and
emerging theories, namely hyperbolic discounting theory, Rubinstein's similarity
procedure, and a novel intertemporal reference-dependent model, presented in
Chapter II. The main result of the survey-based within-subject choice experiment is
that none of these three theories explain subjects' behaviour. However, I do find that,
among these three theories, the novel intertemporal model of reference-dependent
preferences performs no worse than Rubinstein's similarity procedure, and
hyperbolic discounting theory performs the worst with subjects' behaviour on subset
of questions. Moreover, I could reject the hypothesis that the subjects made their
choices at random. Finally, I also found that their behaviour is not consistent with
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
16 I would like to thank the Edinburgh Campaign for financial support on this experiment, Santiago
Sanchez-Pages and Marco Faravelli for useful and constructive suggestions, and Eva Alevyzaki, Alia
Doubrovina, Sascha Mohr, Duncan Whitehead, Zhewei Wang, and Haibo Zhang for help to run the
experiment.
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1. Introduction
Intertemporal decision-making involves tradeoffs between consumptions and savings
occurring at different time period, and affects not only an individual's wealth,
happiness but also economic prosperity of every country. While intertemporal
decision-making is one of the most important human activities, economists still
disagree about what is the best way to model decision-making over time.
As intertemporal decision-making is one of the most important human activities,
there have been a large number of experimental studies of choices over time. These
experimental studies indicate several systematic violations which question the
validity of the standard exponential discounted utility model (see Section 2.2 of
Chapter I ). These experimental studies indicate that discount rates are not constant
over time but decline as if humans had hyperbolic discounting; gains are discounted
more than losses; small amount of outcomes are discounted more than large amount
ones; delaying a consumption requires more compensation than people are willing to
pay to speed it up; and outcomes are discounted as a sequence is different from
outcomes are discounted singly.
In this chapter, I explore whether subjects' behaviour in a survey-based
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within-subject choice experiment is consistent with a number of existing and
emerging theories, namely hyperbolic discounting theory (see Section 3 of Chapter
I ), Rubinstein's similarity procedure (see Section 5 of Chapter I ), and a novel
intertemporal reference-dependent model (see Chapter II and Chapter III). The main
result of the survey-based within-subject choice experiment is that none of these
three theories explain subjects' behaviour. However, I do find that, among these three
theories, the novel intertemporal model of reference-dependent preferences performs
no worse than Rubinstein's similarity procedure, and hyperbolic discounting theory
performs the worst with subjects' behaviour on subset of questions. Moreover, I
could reject the hypothesis that the subjects made their choices at random. Finally, I
also found that their behaviour is not consistent with Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives.
Although the exponential discounted utility model has dominated economic analysis
of intertemporal decision-making since it was introduced by Samuelson (1937), there
is a lot of empirical and experimental evidence which is inconsistent with predictions
of the exponential discounted utility model (see Thaler (1981), Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992), and Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002)). For example,
in a study of Thaler (1981), an individual would prefer one apple today to two apples
tomorrow, and at the same time she would prefer two apples in 51 days to one apple
in 50 days from now, which reveals that an individual's time discount rate over
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longer time horizons is lower than her time discount rate over short time horizons.
Hyperbolic discounting theory was first studied by Strotz (1956), which offers an
alternative model of intertemporal decision-making. After the influential work of
Laibson (1997), hyperbolic discounting theory has been widely accepted by
economists, and has been applied in a large range of issues (see Frederick,
Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002)).
Although hyperbolic discounting theory successfully captures that an individual's
preference over time is dynamically inconsistent, its descriptive validity continues to
be challenged. In the study of Rubinstein (2003), subjects in each of three
experiments reveal their preferences over two pairs of intertemporal options.
Rubinstein (2003) argues that subjects' choices are incompatible with hyperbolic
discounting theory, but could be explained by the similarity procedure, introduced in
Rubinstein (1988).
Reference-dependent preference was first studied by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
in which an individual's preferences are defined over changes of wealth relative to
her reference level; individuals care much more about losses than gains; individuals
reveal diminishing sensitivity for both gains and losses, which means that an
S-shaped utility function that is concave over domain of gains and convex over
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domain of losses with a kink at zero. Since the influential work of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), the theory of reference-dependent preferences has been applied in
analysis of intertemporal decision-making, for example, see Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992), Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) and Koszegi and Rabin (2007). Based
on the idea of loss aversion studied by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and the idea
of mental accounting studied by Thaler (1980, 1985, and 1999), a novel
intertemporal model of reference-dependent preferences may offer an alternative
model of intertemporal decision-making.
In this chapter, I question whether Rubinstein's similarity procedure is the only
viable alternative to the hyperbolic discounting theory. I suggest that the novel
intertemporal model of reference-dependent preferences works no worse than
similarity-based procedure and better than hyperbolic discounting theory.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to description of
experimental methods, design of the survey-based within-subject choice experiment
and experimental hypotheses; experimental data is analyzed is section 3; finally,
discussion and conclusion are presented in section 4.
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2. Experimental Methods and Hypotheses
Due to the difficulties of interpreting empirical field data, an increasingly popular
practice is to run economic experiments. In contrast to collecting field data from the
real world, an economic experiment is conducted in an artificial environment,
allowing investigator for greater control over external influences on subjects'
behaviour.
2.1. A Brief Overview of Experimental Methods
There are two most popular experimental designs used in the experimental study in
intertemporal decision-making, which are choice design and matching design.17
Choice design is the most popular method used in the experimental study in
intertemporal decision-making. Subjects are required to choose between a pair of
intertemporal options, which typically are a small but early outcome and a larger but
later outcome. Although it would be better if subjects are only offered one treatment
in each session of experiment, choice design could only reveal an upper or lower
bound of the discount rate from each pair of intertemporal options, hence subjects are
17 If a subject's experimental payoff is not in a monotonic relationship with her behaviour in experiment,
then this kind of experiments is called survey. Here, in this section, we consider how questions are
presented in experiment (or survey). For discussion of definition of experiment and survey, see
Friedman and Cassar (2004).
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generally asked to choose over multiple pairs of intertemporal options with different
outcomes associated with different dates. For example, Rubinstein (2003) used
choice design and reported that subjects' behaviour is inconsistent with predictions of
hyperbolic discounting theory. The major problem of choice design with multiple
1 R
pairs of intertemporal options is the sequence effect , also known as anchoring
effect or order effect. The sequence effect is arises when, for example, a subject is
offered two pairs of intertemporal options (questions), and her response to the first
question would bias the subject towards giving a similar response to the second one.
Although some economists suggested to minimize this effect by offering subjects a
series of options, over which subjects' response are opposite to each other, the
sequence effect may not be eliminated and, in addition, other problems may arise
(see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002)).
Another popular design of experiments on intertemporal decision-making is
matching design. In matching design, subjects are required to give an answer which
is equal to the given intertemporal option (e.g. £15 today =£ in 30 days). Rather
than giving an upper or lower bound of discount rates, subjects' responses reveal the
exact discount rate in matching design. For example, Thaler (1981) applied the
matching design and revealed that small outcomes are discounted more than large
outcomes. Anchoring effect (sequence effect, order effect) is not an issue in matching
18
Sequence effect describes that, for example, if a subject is offered two treatments (questions) in one
session, then response to the first treatment would lead the subject to be more willing to have similar
response to the second treatment. See Davis and Holt (1993, p30).
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design, which is the major advantage of matching design. The major problem of
matching design is that subjects may apply some simple rules rather than carefully
think about their time preferences, resulting in the discount rates reported from
experimental studies to vary across studies.
In addition to the two most popular experimental designs, rating design is also used
in experimental study of intertemporal decision-making. In a rating design, each
subject is required to rate each intertemporal option in terms of attractiveness or
aversiveness. In addition, experimental studies in intertemporal decision-making also
employ pricing design, where each subject is required to give her/his willingness to
pay to receive some intertemporal options. For example, Loewenstein (1988) applied
pricing design and found that people will require more compensation to delay
amount of consumption than they are willing to pay to speed it up. Anchoring effect
is also a problem of these two experimental designs.
Furthermore, intertemporal options presented in an experiment could involve either
real situation or hypothetical situation. Hypothetical situation provide opportunities
to elicit subjects' preferences where implementing the real situation is impractical if
not impossible, but subjects may not carefully treat hypothetical situation and may
not give the same responses as they would do in a real situation. Despite their
potential limitations, experiments involving hypothetical situations remain to be an
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easier and more popular method of eliciting individual preferences.
2.2. Survey-Based Experiment and Hypotheses
The survey-based within-subject choice experiment was conducted in February of
2007 at the University of Edinburgh. 127 undergraduate students of the University of
Edinburgh were invited to participate in the choice experiment. There were six
experimental sessions; each session was conducted at the beginning of an economic
tutorial. Students in each session were treated as one group and agreed to participate
as unpaid volunteers. In question 1 and question 2, subjects are required to choose
the favourite choice of each pair of options, and in question 3, subjects are required
to rank options from the most favourite one to the least one.
Since the survey-based experiment involved within-subject design, the possibility of
the sequence effect (order effect, anchoring effect) was of concern. Hence, in order to
focus subjects on each question and reduce the sequence effect between questions,
but still be able to study subjects' responses to multi-treatments, questions in the
survey-based experiment are offered as following:
Ql. Imagine that you have won a lottery, which is worth £ 157 that will be received
on September 16th 2008. Would you want to delay payment by one day and gain £ 1
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in compensation? Please circle your choice. (Yes or No)19
Q2. Imagine that you have to choose between the following two options:
Please circle your choice.
A. Receiving £ 157 on March 17th 2008
B. Receiving £307 on September 17th 2008
Q3. Imagine that you have an investment opportunity on January 2008, which would
offer you the following four payoff options for every unit you invest:
A. Receiving £307 on March 17th 2009
B. Receiving £ 158 on September 17th 2008
C. Receiving £67 on June 16th 2008
D. Receiving £ 157 on September 16th 2008
Could you please rank these options from the most favourite to the least one?
Notice that, in question 3, option B and option D offer same pair of payments and
dates as those offered in question 1.
19 An informal study supports the hypothesis that there is no significant differences of responses
between question 1 and the following question: Imagine that you have to choose between the following
two options: Please circle your choice
(A) Receiving £157 on September 16th 2008
(B) Receiving £158 on September 17th 2008
In addition, there are no significant differences of responses between different orders of options in the
above question.
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There are three major hypotheses involved in this choice experiment. Hypotheses
and predictions of each hypothesis of each question are presented as following:
Hypothesis 1. Subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of hyperbolic
discounting theory (see section 3 of Chapter I ). Hence, if subjects' responses are
consistent with predictions of hyperbolic discounting theory, subjects' responses are
predicted as follow:
(i) Subjects who choose "No" in question 1 would choose "A" in question 2.
(ii) Subjects who choose "No" in question 1 would rank "D" higher than "B" in
question 3.
(iii) Subjects who choose "Yes" in question 1 would rank "B" higher than "D" in
question 3.
(iv) The theory has no prediction to question 2 when "Yes" is chosen in question 1.
Therefore, hyperbolic discounting theory rules out the following possibilities of
combination of choices:
(i) choosing "No" in question 1 and "B" in question 2;
(ii) choosing "Yes" in question 1 and ranking "D" higher than "B" in question 3;
(iii) choosing "No" in question 1 and ranking "B" higher than "D" in question 3.
If subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of hyperbolic discounting
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theory (Rubinstein (2003)), subjects will choose "No" in question 1 if the parameter
S. < V^^\, where t* =17/09/2008, but will choose "Yes" otherwise. If subjects'' u(l58)
responses are consistent with predictions of hyperbolic discounting theory, those
subjects, who choose "No" in question 1, should choose option A in question 2.
Therefore, choosing "No" in question 1 but choosing option B in question 2 is
inconsistent with the above described hyperbolic discounting theory.
Proof: (Similar to Rubinstein (2003))
Choosing "No" in question 1 implies that <5,u(l58)-L>(l58-l)< 0 , where
t* = 17/09/2008 . The concavity of v and the fact that the discount rate is
monotonic decreasing imply that u(x-l)< 0 for any amount of money
x > 158 and s earlier than September 17th 2008.
£.u(307)<u(307-l)
307) < <?,._,u(307 - 2 x (1)) < <5,. .,,^(307 - 2 x (l))
A-"(307) < A™-3x 0)) < 3 x (1))
8,..,u(307)<8X... lgou(307-180x(l))
Therefore, the straightforward calculation implies that
(TL,«.TO07)-(TL,,.. f(307 -18»* (D) < o • In fact ,hat
307-180 <157 completes the proof. Therefore, choosing "No" in question 1 but
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choosing option B in question 2 are incompatible not only with the standard
exponential discounted utility model but also with hyperbolic discounting theory.
□
Hypothesis 2. Subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of Rubinstein's
similarity procedure (see Rubinstein (1988, 2003), and section 5 of Chapter I ). The
theory has no prediction on each single question, but a subject's preferences of
question 1 and question 3 should be consistent with each other. Then subjects'
responses are described as following:
(i) if a subject chooses "No" in question 1, s/he would rank "D" higher than "B" in
question 3;
(ii) if a subject choose "Yes" in question 1, s/he would rank "B" higher than "D" in
question 3.
Therefore, Rubinstein's similarity procedure rules out two possibilities of choices:
(i) choosing "Yes" in question 1 but ranking "D" higher than "B" in question 3;
(ii) choosing "No" in question 1 but ranking "B" higher than "D" in question 3.
Rubinstein's similarity procedure has no specified prediction on question 1, hence, a
subject will choose "No" in question 1, if s/he treat £157 and £158 as similar
amount of money, but the dates September 16th 2008 is preferred to September 17th
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2008. Otherwise, s/he will choose "Yes" in question 1. Furthermore, the theory has
no specified prediction on question 2 either. Hence, a subject will choose option B in
question 2, if s/he treat the two dates in options as similar, but amount of money
£307 is preferred. Otherwise, s/he will choose option A.
The theory predicts that if a subject chooses "No" in question 1, s/he would rank "D"
higher than "B" in question 3; or if a subject choose "Yes" in question 1, s/he would
rank "B" higher than "D" in question 3. Therefore, choosing "No" in question 1 but
ranking option B higher than option D in question 3, are not only incompatible with
both hyperbolic discounting theory and Rubinstein's similarity procedure but also
break the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, such that, the utility from an
option is unaffected by other options that might be experienced in prior or future
periods.
Hypothesis 3. Subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of the
intertemporal reference-dependent model (see Chapter II) where the reference level
is choice-set dependent, which is the option offering the earliest date of payment.
Then subjects' responses are described as following:
(i) choosing "No" in question 1, choosing "B" in question 2, and ranking "B"
higher than "D" in question 3 for some range of parameters;
(ii) choosing "No" in question 1, choosing "A" in question 2, and ranking "B"
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higher than "D" in question 3 for a different range of parameters;
(iii) choosing "Yes" in question 1, choosing "B" in question 2, and ranking "B"
higher than "D" in question 3 for another different range of parameters .
(Please see appendix E for range calculation).
Therefore, the intertemporal reference-dependent model rules out two possibilities of
combination of choices:
(i) choosing "Yes" in question 1 but choosing "A" in question 2;
(ii) ranking option "D" higher than option "B" in question 3.
Consider now the intertemporal reference-dependent model, where the reference is
the option offering the earliest date of payment. Let us write choice "No" in question
1 as (l5716/09/08,017/09/og), where the first value represents receiving £157 on
September 16th 2008 and the second value represents receiving £0 on September
17th 2008. Similarly, let us write choice "Yes" as (016/09/08,15817/09/08). Then, if
subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of the intertemporal
reference-dependent model, they would choose "No" as long as the inequality
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In question 2, the choice-set dependent reference level is "receiving £ 157 on March
16th 2008". Similarly, let us write choice A in question 2 as (l5716/03/08 ,017/09/08),
where the first value represents receiving £157 on March 16th 2008 and the
second value represents receiving £0 on September 17th 2008. Let us write choice
B as (016/03/08,30717/09/og). Then, if subjects' responses are consistent with the
intertemporal reference-dependent model, they would choose option B, as long as the
150 307
inequality 77 < holds, where A > > 1. Therefore, as long as the
157T-307 157
inequality ^ <r/< holds, where A>\ , subjects would
157T-158 157T-307
choose "No" in question 1, but choose option B in question 2.
Similarly, the choice-set dependent reference level is " receiving £67 on June 16th
2008" in question 3, then let us write choice A in question 3 as
(^17/06/08'®i6/09/08'^i7/09/08'^^^17/03/09) » choice B as
(^17/06/08 '^16/09/08 '^^17/09/08 '^17/03/09 ) ' Ch°iCe C aS (67,6/06/08,0,6/09/08,0|7/09/08,017/03/09) ,
and choice D as (Ol6/06/08,15716/09/08 ,017/09/08 ,017/03/09). Then, if subjects' responses are
consistent with the intertemporal reference-dependent model, they would rank B
higher than option D in question 3.
107
Chapter IV. A Survey-Based Within-Subject Choice Experiment on Intertemporal
Decision-Making
3. Data Analysis
In this section, I explore whether subject responses are consistent with the
hypotheses described in section 3. There are three groups working as control group;
group 1, 13 subjects were required to answer question 1; group 2, 18 subjects were
required to answer question 2; and group 3, 19 subjects were required to answer
question 3. In addition, there were three treatment groups, such that 33 subjects were
required to answer both question 1 and question 2 as group 4; 28 subjects were
required to answer both question 1 and question 3 as group 5; and 16 subjects were
required to answer all three questions as group 6. In the groups of 4, 5, and 6,
questions were simultaneously offered to subjects. Table 4 represents the allocation







Group6 Q1,Q2, Q3 16
Total 127
Table 4. Allocation of questions
20 The purpose of allocating different questions to different group is to test for reference-dependent
preference within questions. If there was reference-dependent preference across questions, answers to,
for example, question 1 in group 1 and group 6 would be different.
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To make results more comparable, choosing "Yes" in question 1 is interpreted as
delaying payment, but choosing "No" is interpreted as not delaying payment;
choosing "B" in question 2 is interpreted as delaying payment, but choosing "A" as
not delaying payment; ranking "B" higher than "D" in question 3 is interpreted as
delaying payment, but ranking "D" higher than "B" is interpreted as not delaying
payment.
Table 5 represents subjects' responses to question 1 from group 1, group 4, group 5,
and group 6; Table 6 represents subjects' responses to question 2 from group 2, group
4, and group 6; and Table 7 represents subjects' responses to question 3 from group 3,
group 5, and group 6.
Qi G 1 G4 G 5 G 6
Delay (Yes) 10 22 16 9 57
No Delay (No) 3 11 12 7 33
13 33 28 16 90
Table 5. Responses to question 1
Chi-square test for 4 samples in Table 5 shows that there is no statistically significant
7 91
difference between distributions of responses to question 1, (% = 1.99, p = 0.57).
21 For Chi-square and other non-parametric test see Sigel and Castellan (1988). The theoretical
Chi-square distribution is a continuous distribution, hence the calculation of the test statistic from
observed data is only an approximation to a true Chi-square variable, but this approximation would be
good enough as long as each expected (not observed) value in each cell, for example Table 5, is greater
than or equal to five.
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In addition, Chi-square test for 3 samples in Table 6 shows that there is no
statistically significant difference between distributions of responses to question 2,
(Z2 =2.16, p = 0.34).
Q2 G 2 G 4 G 6
Delay (B) 18 30 14 62
No Delay (A) 0 3 2 5
18 33 16 67
Table 6. Responses to question 2
Q3 G 3 G 5 G 6
Delay A/B/D/C 11 16 6 33
(B>- D) B/D/A/C 4 3 3 10
A/C/B/D 0 1 0 1
A/B/C/D 0 0 1 1
B/A/D/C 0 1 2 3
Delay total 15 21 12 48
No A/D/B/C 4 3 4 11
Delay D/B/A/C 0 2 0 2
(D>B) C/D/B/A 0 1 0 1
A/D/C/B 0 1 0 1
No delay total 4 7 4 15
Total 19 28 16 63
Table 7. Responses to question 3, the highest rank to the lowest rank are represented from left to right.
Furthermore, Chi-square test for 3 samples in Table 7 shows that there is no
statistically significant difference between distributions of responses to question 3 in
no
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terms of delay or no delay, ( —0.11, p = 0.94 )22.
Therefore, in other words, each question is independently treated in group 4, group 5,
and group 6 respectively. Such that, for example, delaying payment by choosing
"Yes" in question 1 will not lead subject be more willing to delay payment by
choosing option B in question 2.
Furthermore, responses to the combination of question 1 and question 2 and
responses to the combination of question 1 and question 3 are also analyzed. Table 8
represents responses to question 1 and question 2 in group 4 and group 6. Chi-square
test for 2 samples in Table 8 shows that there is no statistically significant difference
between distributions of responses to question 1 and question 2, (^2=1.05,
p = 0.78).
Q1/Q2 G 4 G 6
Yes/A 1 1 2
Yes/B 21 8 29
No/A 1 1 2
No/B 10 6 16
33 16 49
Table 8. Responses to question 1 and question 2 in group 4 and group 6.
In addition, Table 9 represents responses to question 1 and question 3 in group 5 and
22
For discussion of property of transitivity in the question 3 see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995,
page 7), Tversky et al. (1990), Roelofsma and Read (2000).
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group 6. Chi-square test for 2 samples in Table 9 shows that there is no statistically
significant difference between distributions of responses to question 1 and question 3,
(X2 — 2-27, p = 0.52).
Q1/Q3 G 5 G 6
Yes/B>-D Yes/A/B/D/C 12 4 16
Yes/A/C/B/D 1 0 1
Yes/A/B/C/D 0 1 1
Yes/B/A/D/C 1 0 1
Yes/B/D/A/C 2 3 5
Yes/ B > D total 16 8 24
Yes/D >- B Yes/A/D/B/C 0 1 1
Yes/D>- B total 0 1 1
No!B>D No/A/B/D/C 4 2 6
No/B/A/D/C 0 2 2
No/B/D/A/C 1 0 1
No/B > D total 5 4 9
NoID >- B No/D/B/A/C 2 0 2
No/A/D/B/C 3 0 3
No/A/D/C/B 1 3 4
No/C/D/B/A 1 0 1
NoID >- B total 7 3 10
Total 28 16 44
Table 9. Responses to question 1 and question 3 in group 5 and group 6.
Since there is no statistically significant difference among responses to each question
in different groups, nonparametric tests are going to focus on changing choices (i.e.
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choosing "No" in question 1, choosing "B" in question 2, ranking "B" higher than
"D" in question 3) in group 4, group 5, and group 6.
In group 4, 2 subjects changed their choices from delaying payment by choosing
"Yes" in question 1 to not delaying payment by choosing option A in question 2; at
the same time, 10 subjects changed their choices from delaying payment by choosing
option B in question 2 to not delaying payment by choosing "No" in question 1. In
addition, in group 6, 1 subject changed his/her choices from delaying payment by
choosing "Yes" in question 1 to not delaying payment by choosing option A in
question 2; at the same time, 6 subjects changed their choices from delaying payment
by choosing option B in question 2 to not delaying payment by choosing "No" in
question 1. Table 10 represents the pool of subjects' responses to question 1 and
question 2 from group 4 and group 6.
Q l
Delay (Yes) No Delay (No)
Q 2 No Delay (A) 3 2 5
Delay (B) 28 16 44
31 18 49
Table 10. Pool of subjects' responses to question 1 and question 2 from group 4 and group 6.
3.1. Testing Hyperbolic Discounting Theory
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First consider the null hypothesis that subjects' choices are made randomly. That is
the probability that a subject will choose "No" (no delay) in question 1 but choose
"B" (delay) in question 2 will be the same as the probability that a subject will
choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1 but choose "A" (no delay) in question 2. This
hypothesis can be rejected, =7.5789, p = 0.0059), in favour of the alternative
hypothesis that the probability that a subject will choose "No" (no delay) in question
1 but choose "B" (delay) in question 2 will be higher than the probability that a
subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1 but choose "A" (no delay) in question
2.
Result 1. Hypothesis 1 that subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of
hyperbolic discounting theory (see section 2.2 ofpresent chapter) is rejected.
3.2. Testing Rubinstein's Similarity Procedure
Now consider responses to question 1 and question 3. In group 5, 0 subjects change
their choices from delaying payment by choosing "Yes" in question 1 to not delaying
payment by ranking option D higher than option B in question 3; at the same time, 5
subjects change their choices from delaying payment by ranking option B higher
than option D in question 3 to not delaying payment by choosing "No" in question 1.
In addition, in group 6, 1 subject changes his/her choices from delaying payment by
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choosing "Yes" in question 1 to not delaying payment by ranking option D higher
than option B in question 3; at the same time, 4 subjects change their choices from
delaying payment by ranking option B higher than option D in question 3 to not
delaying payment by choosing "No" in question 1. Table 11 represents the pool of
subjects' responses to question 1 and question 3 from group 5 and group 6.
Q 1
Delay (Yes) No Delay (No)
Q 3 No Delay (D B) 1 10 11
Delay (B y D) 24 9 33
25 19 44
Table 11. Pool of subjects' responses to question 1 and question 3 from group 5 and group 6.
Now consider the null hypothesis that subjects' choices are made randomly. That is
the probability that a subject will choose "No" (no delay) in question 1 but rank "B"
higher than "D" (delay) in question 3 will be the same as the probability that a
subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1 but rank "D" higher than "B" (no
2 23
delay) in question 3. This hypothesis can be rejected, =4.9, p- 0.02686) , in
favour of the alternative hypothesis that the probability that a subject will choose
"No" (no delay) in question 1 but rank "B" higher than "D" (delay) in question 3 will
be higher than the probability that a subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1
but rank "D" higher than "B" (no delay) in question 3.
23 If only the cases of that option B and option D are ranked next to each other are considered, then
j2 =3.15 and p = 0.077-
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Result 2. Hypothesis 2 that subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of
Rubinstein's similarity procedure (see section 2.2 ofpresent chapter) is rejected.
3.3. Testing the Intertemporal Reference-Dependent Model
To test for the intertemporal reference-dependent model, consider again the pool of
responses to question 1 and question 3, which are represented in Table 11. Let us first
explore the null hypothesis that subjects' choices are made randomly, so that the
probability that a subject will choose "No" (no delay) in question 1 but rank "B"
higher than "D" (delay) in question 3 will be the same as the probability that a
subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1 but rank "D" higher than "B" (no
2 24
delay) in question 3. This hypothesis can be rejected, (% =4.9, p = 0.02686) , in
favour of the alternative hypothesis that the probability that a subject will choose
"No" (no delay) in question 1 but rank "B" higher than "D" (delay) in question 3 will
be higher than the probability that a subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1
but rank "D" higher than "B" (no delay) in question 3, which is consistent with
prediction of the novel intertemporal reference-dependent model with
choice-dependent reference point. In addition, proportion of responses consistent
24 If only the cases of that option B and option D are ranked next to each other are considered, then = 3.15
and p = 0.077.
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with the novel intertemporal reference-dependent model with choice-dependent
reference point, which is represented in Table 6, should also be considered, since the
intertemporal reference-dependent model predicts individuals would always prefer
option A to option B to option D but rules out all other possible ranking over these
three options in question 3. Importantly, there are only ~ 55.56% of choices
are consistent with the novel intertemporal reference-dependent model.
Result 3. Hypothesis 3 that subjects' responses are consistent with predictions of the
novel intertemporal reference-dependent model with choice-set dependent reference
point (see section 2.2) is rejected.
In summary, choosing to receive £ 157 on September 16th 2008 in the first question,
but choosing to receive £307 on September 17th 2008 in the second question is
inconsistent with either exponential discounted utility model or hyperbolic
discounting theory. Furthermore, ranking the option of receiving £ 158 on
September 17th 2008 higher than the option of receiving £ 157 on September 16th
2008 do not only contradict the choice in the first question (choosing to receive
£ 157 on September 16th 2008), but is also inconsistent with either the exponential
discounted utility model or hyperbolic discounting theory or Rubinstein's similarity
procedure. Note that, both hyperbolic discounting theory and Rubinstein's similarity
procedure assume that subjects' choice should not be affected by choice set. While,
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in contrast, the intertemporal reference-dependent model allows for a possibility that
subjects may have different reference level in each question, and allow for effect of
choice set on subjects' choice.
3.4. Testing the Relative Performance of the Three Theories
Since each theory rules out some combination of choices, it is important to analyze
the proportions of such observations. Table 12 summarize proportions of
observations which are inconsistent with each theory.
Q1/Q2 Q1/Q3
HD No/B Yes/D>B No!B>D
16/ 1/ 9//49 744 744
RS N/A Yes/D y B N/B D
N/A 1/ 9/744 744
RD Yes/A Yes/D ^ B N/Z) >- B
3/ 1/ 10/749 /44 744
Table 12. Inconsistent observations and proportions, where HD stands for Hyperbolic Discounting
Theory, RS stands for Rubinstein's Similarity procedure, and RD stands for Intertemporal
Reference-Dependent Model.
Importantly, there is no strong winner among these theories. The performance of the
three theories for Q1/Q3 comparison is virtually indistinguishable. As for Q1/Q2,
hyperbolic discounting theory performs far worse than the intertemporal
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reference-dependent model ( ~ 32.56% of choices are inconsistent with
hyperbolic discounting theory versus ^/^g ~ 6.12% of choices are inconsistent with
the intertemporal reference-dependent model). However, Q1/Q2 can not be used to
analyze relative performances of Rubinstein's similarity procedure versus the
intertemporal reference-dependent model, since Rubinstein's similarity procedure
allow all possible combination of choices in Q1/Q2 (therefore no specified
9 S
predictions).
3.5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Apart from above described hypotheses and tests - if subjects' responses are
consistent with each of the three intertemporal decision-making theories, we should
also consider if subjects' responses violate the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives that the utility from an option is unaffected by other options that might
be experienced in prior or future periods.
Hypothesis 4. Subjects' responses are consistent with the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives. That is, if subjects' behaviours satisfy the of Independence Irrelevant
Alternatives, then
(i) if "Yes" is preferred in question 1, the option B should be ranked higher than
25 For an alternative explanation (Vague theory), which does not work for changing choices in Q1/Q3, of
combinations of choices in Q1/Q2 see Manzini and Mariotti (2006).
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option D in question 3;
(ii) if "No" is preferred in question 1, the option D should be ranked higher than
option D in question 3.
Therefore, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives rules out possibility of
changing choice between question 1 and question 3.
Similar to the discussion in section 3.2 (testing Rubinstein's similarity), Table 11
represents the pool of subjects' responses to question 1 and question 3 from group 5
and group 6. The null hypothesis is that subjects' choices are made randomly. That is
the probability that a subject will choose "No" (no delay) in question 1 but rank "B"
higher than "D" (delay) in question 3 will be the same as the probability that a
subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1 but rank "D" higher than "B" (no
9 96
delay) in question 3. This hypothesis can be rejected, (x =4.9, p = 0.02686) , in
favour of the alternative hypothesis that the probability that a subject will choose
"No" (no delay) in question 1 but rank "B" higher than "D" (delay) in question 3 will
be higher than the probability that a subject will choose "Yes" (delay) in question 1
but rank "D" higher than "B" (no delay) in question 3.
26 If only the cases of that option B and option D are ranked next to each other are considered, then
;r = 3.15 and P = 0.077.
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Result 4. Hypothesis 4 that subjects' responses are consistent with the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives is rejected. In addition, the hypothesis that subjects'
behaviour is random is rejected as well.
Obviously, preferring to receive £ 157 on September 16th 2008 in the first question,
jL
but ranking the option of receiving £ 158 on September 17 2008 higher than the
option of receiving £ 157 on September 16th 2008 do not only contradict either the
exponential discounted utility model or hyperbolic discounting theory or
Rubinstein's similarity procedure, but violate the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives that the utility from an option is unaffected by other options that might
be experienced in prior or future periods.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
This survey-based choice experiment involves a within subject design and can be
seen as a pilot study that may be of use for a further study in the intertemporal
decision-making. Subjects' responses are inconsistent with predictions of hyperbolic
discounting theory and Rubinstein's similarity procedure. The experiment results
also indicate that reference-dependent preferences could be only one of many
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possible reasons why subjects change their choices, because not every subject
behaves exactly in the direction ofwhat the intertemporal reference-dependent model
predicts. Possibly, individuals' reference points are unobservable, and may vary
across individuals. This reflects the weakness of the model of reference-dependent
preferences, parameters are very flexible, but there is always a trade-off between a
more elaborate model with some flexible parameters and a simple model with a
smaller number of parameters. The aim of building up an economic theory is not to
just explain a single experiment but to give some predictions about what will happen
in the future experiences. Hence further research is needed to pin down these
parameters. In addition, future research may also be aimed at eliciting
individual-specific reference points. Furthermore, more research can be aimed at
comparing relative performance of Rubinstein's similarity procedure versus the
intertemporal reference-dependent model.
In conclusion, supported by the analysis of data collected in the survey-based choice
experiment, none of the three theories works better that the others in explaining the
experimental data. Results of the choice experiment also indicate that the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is violated and subjects did not make their
choices at random. In addition, results of the survey-based choice experiment also
indicate that hyperbolic discounting theory performs the worst among the three
theories, and the intertemporal reference-dependent model performs no worse than
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Appendices
Appendix A: Preferences over Two Time Periods
In the intertemporal context, these two intertemporal options could be represented as:
option A:(c,0), and option 5;(0,c). The individual's reference levels tomorrow
follow the random walk process, thus prob{r2 = rx-a) = p , prob(r2 = rx)=l-p-q,
and prob(r2 = rx+a) = q, where rx - a > 0, and a > 0 .
q y
Case 1, where L < -1. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[Ua(/", ,c„r2,c2)] = m(cx) + g(c,\rx)+ E[m{c2)+ g(c2\r2)]
= m{c) +g{c\rx)+ p{m(0) + g(o|r, -a))+(l-p- q)(m(o) + g(o|r,))+ q(m(0)+ g(o|r, +«))
= c - Arj(2rx - c)+(p - q)Arja
The utility from option B is given by:
e[Ub (rx ,cx,r2,c2)]= m(cx) + g(c, \rx) + e[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2)]
= tm(0) + g(o|r,)+ p(m(c)+ g(c\rx -a))+(l-p- q)(m(c) + g(c\rx))+ q(m(c) + g{c\rx + a))
= c - Aq(2rx -c)+(p-q)Aqa
Therefore, E[Ua ]- E\iJB ] = 0 for all parameters of probability.
c — V
Case 2, where -1 < l- < 0. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[UA (rx, cx ,r2, c2)] = m(cx) + g(c, \rx)+ E[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2)]
= m{c) + g(c\rx)+ p(m(0) + g(o|r, - a)) + (1 - p - q)(m(o) + g(o|r,))+ q(m(o) + g(o|r,))
= c - Aq(2rx - c)+ (p - q)Aqa
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The utility from option B is given by:
e[ub (r,, c, ,r2, c2)] = m(c, )+g(c, |r,) + e[m(c2) + g(c2|r,)]
= w(0) + g(o|r,) + p(m(c) + g(c|r, - a)) + (1 - p - q)(m(c) + g(c|r,)) + q(m(c) + g(c|r, + a))
= c - Aq(2rx -c) + (p- q)Aqa + p(l - A)q(c — rx +a)
Therefore, e[ua ] - E[Ub ] = p(c - rx + a\A -\)q > 0 as long as p > 0 .
c — V
Case 3, where 0 < 1 < 1. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[ua (r,, c, ,r2,c2)] = m(cx) + g(c, \rx)+ E[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2)]
= m(c) + g(c|r,) + p(m(0) + g(o|r, -a)) + (l-p- q)(m(0) + g(o|r,)) + q(m(0) + g(o|r, + a))
= c - Ar/rx + tj(c -rx)+(p- q)Aqa
The utility from option B is given by:
E\(JB {rx,cx,r2,c2)] = m(cx)+g(c, | rx )+£"[m(c2)+ g(c2 \r2)]
= m(6)+ g(o|r,)+ p{m(c) + g(c\rx -a))+(\-p-q){m{c) + g(c\rx))+ q(m(c) + g(c\rx + a))
= c-Arjrx +Tj(c-rx)+ ppa -qAqa + q(A-l)rj(c- rx)
Therefore, E\uA]~E\uB\ = p{A-\)qa-q{A-\)q{c-rx)> 0 as long as
q a
Notice also that 0 <-—— < 1, hence that E\(JA\-E\uB]< 0 as long as E-<<\,
a q a
such that p <q . Hence the inequality E[UA\-E[lJb]> 0 holds as long as p> q .
q y
Case 4, where l < . The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[Ua (rx, c, ,r2, c2)] = m(c\)+g(c, |r,)+ E[m(c2 )+g(c2|r2)]
= m(c)+ g(c\rx)+ p(m(0)+ g(o|r, -a))+ (1 -p-q)(m(0)+ g(o|r,))+ q(m(o) + g(o|^ + a))
= c-Xqrx +rj(c-r])+(p-q)Ar/a
The utility from option B is given by:
e[Ub (p, c, ,r2,c2)] = m(ct) + g(c, |rx)+ e[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2)]
= m(0) + g(o|/^)+ p(m(c)+ g(c\rx -a))+ (\-p- q)(m{c) +g(c\rx))+ q{m(c)+ g(c|^ + a))
-c-Aqr{ +q(c-r])+(p-q)r/a
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Therefore, e\(Ja ] - e[ub ]=(/?- q\2 - \)qa > 0 as long as p> q .
Therefore, under the circumstance of two time periods, her preferences over these


















Vo p > q P _ c~rx
q a
p<q
1 < c ~ r'
a
p>q p = q p<q
Table 13. Intertemporal preferences of delaying one consumption value, where
prob(r2 = rx — a) = p, prob(r2 = r,) = 1 - p-q. an(t prob(r2 = rx + a) = q ■
Result 1. (Present & Future Bias) Suppose an individual faces choices between
A: (c,0) and B: (0,c) and her preferences are described by (1), (2), and (3) then
(i). (Present bias) When rx-a <c<rx, the individual would have present bias, so
that E(Ua)>E(Ub), as long as p > 0, and when c> rx, the individual would have
present bias, so that E(Ua ) > E(Ub ), as long as p> q.
(ii). (Future Bias) When c> rx, the individual would have future bias, so that
E(Ua) < E(Ub) , as long as p<q.
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(Hi). (Indifference) When c<rx - a, the individual would be indifferent between two
choices, so that E(Ua ) = E{UB ) for all range ofparameters.
Appendix B: Preferences over Three Time Periods
In the intertemporal context, these three intertemporal options could be represented
as: option ^:(c,0,0), option i?:(0,c,0), and C:(o,0,c). There are three possible
reference levels tomorrow such that prob(r2 = r{ - a) = p, prob{r2 =/-,) = 1-p-q,
and prob(r2 = rt+a)=q; and there are five possible reference levels the day after
tomorrow, thus prob(r} = rt- 2a) = p2 , prob{r3 = rx - a) = 2p(l - p - q) ,
prob(r3 = rx)=2pq + (\-p-q)2 , prob(r3 = rl+a)=2q(\-p-q)
prob{r3 = rx + 2a) -q2, where r, - 2a > 0, and a > 0.
c — V
Case 1, where 1 < -2. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[Ua]= i»(c,) + g(c, | r,) + E[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2) + m(c3) + g(c3 \r3)]
= m(c) + g(c|r,) + p(m(0)+ g(o|r, - a))+ (1 - p - q)(m{0) + g(o|r,))+ q(m(0) + g(o|r, + a))
+ p2 (m(o) + g(o|r, - 2a))+ 2p(l -p- # )(m(o) + g(o|r, - a))+ (2pq + (1 -p-q)2 \m(o) + g(o|r,))
+ 2q(\- p — q)(m(f) + g(o|r, +a))+^2(m(o) + g(o|r, +2a))
= c - Aq{frx — c) + 3(p — q)Aqa
The utility from option B is given by:
E[UB]= m(c{) ■+ g(c, |r,)+e[m(c2 ) ■+ g(c, \r2)+ m(c3) ■+ g(c3 |r3)]
= m(0)+ g{0\r{)+ p(m{c)+ g(c\r{ -a))+(\-p-q)(m(c)+ g(c\rt))+ q(m(c) + g(efy\ + a))
+ p2(w(o) + g(o|r, -2a))+ 2p(l-p-q)(m(o)+g(o|^ -a))+ (2pq + (1 -p-q)2\m(0) + g(o|rj))
+ 2q{\-p-q){m{0)+g(f)\r^ + a))+g2(m(o) +g(o|r, +2a))
-c- Aq(3r, -c)+ 3(p -q)Aqa
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The utility from option C is given by:
E[UC ] = m(c,) ■+ g(c, |r,)+ £[777(0,) + g(c2 \r2)+ m(c3) + g(c3 |r3)]
= m(0)+ g(o|r,)+ p(m(0)+ g((% -a))+(1 - p - q){m(0)+ g(o\^ ))+ q{m(o)+ g(o|7] + a))
+ p2(m(c)+ g(c|r, -2a)) + 2/7(1-p-q)(m(c)+g(c|r, -a))+ (2/?? + (1-/7-qf\m{c)+ g(c\r}))
+ 2tf(l-p-0)(ffi(c) + g(c|/-, +«))+ ^2 (w (c)+ g(c|r, +2a))
-c-Xri{brx -c)+3(/7-q)Aqa
Therefore, £[[/J = £[t/s] = e\(Jc\ for all parameters of probability. In addition,
E{Ua)-E{Ub)= 0, and E(Ub)-E(Uc) = 0, therefore e(ua)-E(ub)=e{Ub)~e(Uc)
c — V
Case 2, where - 2 < < -1. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[UA ] = w(c,) + g(c, |r,)+ £[™(c2 ) + g(c2 \r2)+ w(c3) ■+ g(c3 |r3)]
= 777(c) + g(c|r,)+ p(m(6) + g(o]r, -a))+(l-p-q)(m(0) + g(o|r,)) + q(m{0) + g(o|r, + a))
+ p2(m(0) + g(0|r, -2a))+ 2/7(1-p-q)(m(o)+ g(o|r, -a))+ fepq + (l-p-q)2\m(o) + g{°\ri))
+ 2?(l-/7-?)(m(0) + g(0|rl +a))+e2(w(o) + g(o|r, +2a))
= c-2,q{3rx -c) + 3(p - q)Ar/a
The utility from option B is given by:
E\(JB ] = m(C])+ g(c, \rx )+E[m(c2)+ g(c2 \r2)+ m(c3) ■+ g(c3 |r3)]
= 777(0)+ g(0|r,)+ p{m(c) + g(c\rx - a))+ (1 - /? -q){m(c) + g(c|^))+ q(m(c) + g(c\rx + a))
+ p2 (777(0) + g(o|r, - 2a))+ 2p(l -p- q)(m(6) + g(o|r, - a))+ (2pq + (1 -p-qf \m{6) + g(o|/|))
+ 2q(l-p- q)(m(0) + g(o|^ + a))+q2 (777(0) + g(o|r, + 2a))
= c - 2,77(37; - c)+3(p - q)Aqa
The utility from option C is given by:
E[UC ] = 777(0,)+ g(c, |t;)+ E[m(c2)+g(c2 \r2)+ 777(0,)+ g(c3 |r3)]
= 777(0) + g(0|r,)+ 77(777(0) + g(0|r, - a))+(1 - p - q)(m(o) + g(o|r,))+ q(m(o)+ g(o|r, + a))
+ p2(777(c) + g(c\rx -2a))+ 2/7(1 -p-q)(m(c)+ g(c\rx -a))+ fepq + {\-p-q)2\m(c)+ g(c|r,))
+ 2q{\ - p - q)(m(c)+ g(c|r, + a))+ q2 (m(c)+ g(c|r, + 2a))
= £-2,77(37; -c)+3(/7-^)277a-/72(2-l)77(c-r, +2a)
Therefore, e[Ua] = e[Ub]> e[Uc] as long as p > 0. In addition, e(ua)-E(ub) = 0,
and E{uB)-E{uc) = p2(A-l)ri{c-rt+2a), therefore e(ua)-E(ub)<e(ub)-E(Uc) as
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long as p > 0.
c — y
Case 3, where -1 < < 0. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[Ua]= m(c,) + g(c, |\rx)+ E[m(c2 )+g{c2 \r2)+ m(c3) + g(c} \r3)]
= m{c) + g(c|r,)+ p(m(0) + g(o|r, - a))+ (1 - p - q)(m(0) + g(o|r,))+ q(m(o) + g(o|r, + a))
+ p2(m(o) + g(o|r, - 2a))+ 2p(l -p-q){m(6) + g(o|r, -a))+ (2pq + (1 - p-q)2\m{0) + g(o|r,))
+ 2q{\-p-q)(m(o) + g{()\rx + a))+?2(w(o) + g(o|rl +2a))
= c - Aq(3rx -c)+3(p- q)Aqa
The utility from option B is given by:
E[UB] = m(cx) + g(c, |rx)+ E[m{c2 )+g(c2 \r2 )+m(c3)+g(c3 \r3)]
= m(0) + g(o|r,)+ p{m(c) + g{c\rx - a)) + (1 - p - q){m{c) + g(c\rx))+q{m(c) + g(c\rx +a))
+ p2 (m(0) + g(o|r, - 2a))+ 2p(l -p- q)(m(0)+ g(o|^ - a))+ (2pq + (1 -p-qf X»i(o) + g(o|r,))
+ 2q(\-p-q)(m(o)+g(o\rx + a))+q2(m(o)+g(o\rx + 2a))
= c-Aq(3rx -c)+3(p-q)Aqa-p{X-\)q(c-rx +a)
The utility from option C is given by:
E[UC ] = m(cx) + g(c, |rx) + E[m(c2 )■+ g(c2 \r2)+ m(c3) ■+ g(c3 \r3)]
= m(0)+g(0\rx)+ p(m(0)+ g(o|r, -a))+ (1 -p-<?)(m(o) + g(o|r,))+ q(m{6)+ g(o|r, + a))
+ p2(m(c)+ g(c\rx - 2a)) + 2p{\ - p-q)(m(c)+ g(c\rx -a))+ (2pq + (1 -p-q)2\m(c)+ g(c|r,))
+ 2q{\-p-q)(m(c)+g(c\rx+a])+q2{m(c)+g(c\rx+2a))
= c-Xq{irx -c)+?>{p-q)Xqa-2p{\-p-q){X-\)q{c-rx + a)-p2(X-l)q(c-rx +2a)
Therefore, the inequality e\ua}> e[ub\> e\uc] as long as p> 0 and
———— > -——. Notice that -1 < -—— < 0, for 2q + p -1 > 0 then the inequality
2q + p-\ a a
e[ua]>e[ub\>e\uc\ holds, as long as p > 0 and <7 < ~ • Furthermore, for
2q +p- \ <0, the inequality e\ua\>e\ub\>e\uc\ also holds, as long as /?>0and
• In addition, e(ua)-E(Ub) = p(x-\)q(c-rx +a) , and
E(Ub )-E(Uc) = 2p(l-p- q)(X - \)q(c - rx + a) + p2(X-l)q(c - rx + 2a)~ p{X-\)n{c-rx +a)
, therefore E(Ua)-E(Ub)>E(Ub)-E(Uc) as long as >~(c~rt) ? where
2q + p a
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Hm -1 • Therefore the inequality e(u4)-E(Ub)> E(Ub)~E(Uc) holds, as long
p-->0 2q + p
as -1 < -—r2- < o where p > 0 and q < —.
or 2
c — V
Case 4, where 0 < 1 < 1. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[UJ = 777(0,) ■+ g(c, \rx) ■+ E[m(c2) •+ g(c2 \r2) ■+ rn(c3) ■+ g(c3 \r3)]
= m(c)+g(c\r{)+ p(w(o)+g(o|r, -or))+ (l-p-<?)(/m(o)+g(o|r,))+4(777(0)+ g(o|r, + or))
+ p2(777(0)+ g(0|r, -2a))+ 2p(l-p-q){m(o)+ g(o|r, -or))+ (2pq + (1 -p-q)2X^(o)+ g(o|r,))
+ 2q(l - p - q)(m(Q)+g(0|r, + a))+ q2(m(o) + g(o|r, + 2a))
= c + q(c - rt)- 2Aqrt +?>(p-q)Ar/a
The utility from option B is given by:
E[UB\=m(cl)+g(cl\rl)+E[m(c2)+g(c2\r2)+ m(c3) ■4- g(c3 \r3)]
= w(o)+g(o|r1)+ p(m(c) + g(c|r, - or))+ (1 - p - q)(m(c)+g(c|r,))+ 4(777(0) + g(c\r{ + or))
+ p2 (777(0)+ g(0|r, - 2or))+ 2/7(1 -p- q)(m(Q))+g(o|r, - or))+ (2pq + (1 - p - q)2 X?w(°) + g(°|r,))
+ 2qr(l-/7-qr)(w(0)+g(0|r1 +or))+92(m(0) + g(0|r1 +2or))
= c + 77(c - r,)- 22.777-, + 2(p - q)Xqa + (7? - q)qa - q(X -1)77(7-, + or - c)
The utility from option C is given by:
E\Uc] = t?2(c,) + g(o, |t| )+ E[m(c2 )+g(c2 \r2)+ m(c3) + g{c3 \r3)]
= 777(0)+ g(0|r,)+ 77(777(0) + g(0|r, -or))+ (l-p-q){m(o)+ g(o|r,))+ ^(777(0) + g(o|r, + or))
+ p2 (777(0)+ g(c|r, - 2or))+ 2p(\ -p- q)(m{c)+ g(c|r, - or))+ (2pq + (1 -p-q)2 \m{c)+ g(c|r,))
+ 2^(1 -p-q)(m(c)+ g(c|7-, + or))+ q2(777(0)+ g(o|r, -2or))
= c + 77(c- 7-,)-22.777-, + {p-q)2qa + 2(77 -q)qa -q2{X-1)77(7-, + 2or - c)
- 2</(l -p- q){2 -1)77(7", + or - c)
Therefore the inequality e\uA\> e\uB\> e\uc] holds, as long as £>- for fr <1,
q 2 a 2
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and £- > £—r± for £—£- > — . Notice also that 0 < -—— < 1 , the inequality
q a a 2 a
e\ua\>e\ub\ holds as long as p> q . Furthermore, notice also that — < -—£- < l, the
2 a
inequality e(ub)~E(Uc)<0 holds, as long as — q < p . Hence the inequality
e\ua]> e\(jb\> e\uc] holds, as long as p>q for 0<-—— <1 . In addition,
a
E(Ua)-E(Ub)-{p~q\2.~\)qa + q(/1-1)q{rx + a -c) , and
E(u,)-E(uc)={p-qlX-\)na + <,>(A-\)n(r,+2a-c)
_ Henc<;j ^ jnequa|ity
+ 2q{\ -p- q)(/1 - l)q (rx +a- c)-q{A - l)q (r, + a - c)
E(U,)-E(U,)>E(U,)-E(UC) holds, as long as — > — when £—£- < 1 , and
q 2 a 2
> —^-£—£—- when £—r± > i . Notice also that — < -—< l , the inequality
q 2\rx +a-c) a 2 2 a
1 < a < 2 holds, furthermore the inequality — < 2(g~(c~ri»<2 Thereforei
c-rx p c-rx




Case 5, where 1 < L < 2. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E\Ua\= m(cx )+ g(c,|rx)+ E[m(c2) + g(c,\r2) + m(c3)+ g(c3\r3)]
= m(c)+ g(c\rx)+ p(m(0)+ g((% -a))+(l-p-q)(m(0)+ g(o|r,))+ q(m(o) + g(o|r, + a))
+ q2 (m(0) + g(o|/; - 2a))+ 2p(l -p- q)(m(0) + g(o|r, - a)) + (2pq + (1 -p-qf \m{6) + g(o|/; ))
+ 2q{\-p-q){m(0)+g{$)\rx + ar))+#2("*(o)+g(o|r, +2a))
= c + q(c - rx)- 2Xqrx + 3(p - q)2qa
The utility from option B is given by:
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EpB\= m(C1) + g(cI k. ) + ^h(C2 ) + £^2 Ir2 ) + ™(C3 ) + g(C3K )]
= m(0) + g((% ) + p(^(c)+g(c\rt -a))+(l-p- q)(m(c) + g(c|r,))+q(m(c)+g(c\rx - a))
+ p2 (m(0) + g(ok - 2a)) + 2p(l -p- q){m(0)+g(o|r, - a))+(ipq + (1 -p-qfX"»(o)+g(o|r,))
+ 2*7(1 - p — q)(m(6) + g(o|^ + a))+q2(m(o)+g(o\rx+2a))
= c + q(c-rx)-2Aqrx + 2(p - q)Aqa + (p - q)qa
The utility from option C is given by:
E[UC\ = m(c]) + g(c, k )+ E[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2) + m(c3) + g(c3 \r3)]
= m(0)+ g(0|r,)+ p(m(0)+ g(o|r, -a))+ (1 -p-q)(m(0)+ g(o|r,))+ q(m(0)+ g(o|r, + or))
+ p2(m(c)+ g{c\rx -2a))+ 2p(l -p-q){m(c) + g(c\rx -a))+ (2pq + (1 -p -q)2\m{c) + g(c\rx))
+ 2q(l-p- q){m(c)+g(c\rx + a))+ q2(m(c) + g(c|r, + 2a))
= c + q(c - rx)-2Aqrx + (p - q)Aqa + 2(p - q)qa - q2r/{A -\)(rx +2a-c)
Therefore E\uA\> E\ilB\> E\(Jc] as long as P>q • In addition,
E{Ua ) - E(Ub) = {p-q$X-\)pa , and
E{Ub)-E(Uc)= (p-q)(A-\)r/a + q2(A-l)r}(rx +2a-c) , therefore
e(ua)-e(ub)<e(ub)-e(uc) as long as p>q> 0.
c — y
Case 6, where 2 < 1. The utility from option A is given by:
a
E[Ua]= m(ci ) + g(ci k )+E[m{c2) +g{c2\r2)+ m(c3 )+g(c3 |r3)]
= m(c)+g(c\rx)+ p(m(0) + g(o|r, - a))+(1 - /? - q){m(0)+ g(o|r,))+ q(m(0) + g{o\rx + a))
+ P2(m(0)+g(o|r, - 2a))+2p(l -p- q)(m{o)+g(o|r, - a))+ (2pq + (1 - p -q)2\m{o) + g(o\rx))
+ 2<7(1 -p-tf)(w(0) + g(ok + a))+q2(m(o) + g(ok + 2a))
= c + r/{c-rx)-2Aqrx +2>{p-q)Aqa
The utility from option B is given by:
E[Ub \ = m(cx) ■+ g(c, | rx )+E[m{c2) + g(c2 \r2 )+m(c})+ g(c3 |r3)]
= m(0) + g(o|r, )+ p(m(c) + g(c\rx -a))+(l-p- q){m(c)+g(c\rx))+ q{m{c)+g(c|r, - a))
+ p2 (m(0) + g(o|r, - 2a)) ■+ 2p(l -p- q)(m(o) + g(o|r, -a))+ (2pq + {\-p-q)2 \m(o) + g(o|r,))
+ 2q(l-p-q)(m(0)+g(0\rx + a))+q2(m{6)+g($)\rx +2a))
~c + r]{c-rx)-2Aqrx + 2(p -q)Aqa + (p - q)qa
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The utility from option C is given by:
E\UC\ = m (c,) + g(c, |r,)+ E [m(c2)+ g(c, \r2) + m(c3)+ g(c3 |r3)]
= w(0) + g(o|r,)+ p(m(0) + g(o|r, - a))+ (1 - p - q)(m{0) + g(o|r,))+ g(m(o) + g(o|rj + a))
+ p'(m{c)+ g(c\rx - 2a))+ 2p(l -p-q)(m(c) + g(c\rx -a))+ (ipq + (1 -p -qf\m{c) + g(c|r,))
+ 2^(l-p-^)(w(c) + g(c|r1 +a))+q1{m{c)+g{c\^ +2a))
= c + p{c - r^)-2A.qrx +{p- q)A.qa + 2(p - q)qa
Therefore e[ua ] > e\(Jb ] > e[uc ] as long as p>q . In addition,
E(Ua)- E(Ub) = (p-q\A-\)qa , and E(UA)-E(UB)= (p-qXA-l)qa , therefore
e(ua)-e(ub)=e(ub)-e(uc).
Result 2. (Diminishing marginal utility over time) Suppose an individual faces
choices A: (c,0,0), B: (0,c,0), and C:(0,0,c); and her preferences are described by
(1), (2), and (3) then the individual's expected lifetime utility would decrease when
the consumption level is delayedperiod by period, so that E(u4)> E(Ub)> E(UC), as
well as the difference between two consecutive expected utilities, so that
e{ua)-e{ub)>e{ub)-e(uc),
(i). when rx-a <c<rx as long as p_> 0 and p+ < .
(ii). when rx <c<rx + a as long as p_> p+.
In a summary, in the situation of two time periods, an individual's preferences over
the above-mentioned two intertemporal options would show as present bias when
_l < c~ri as long as the probability of decreasing her reference level higher than the
a
probability of increasing her reference level, such that p> q \ or future bias when
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0 < - ft as long as the probability of decreasing her reference level lower than the
a
probability of increasing her reference level, such that p <q. Furthermore, in the
situation of three time periods, her expected utilities of delaying the given amount of
consumption value are decreasing over time as well as differences between two
consecutive expected utilities when the given amount of consumption value is in the
2qneighbourhood of her reference level of today, such that - <^<1.
a2q + p
Overall, the individual's intertemporal preferences are driven by the random walk
process of reference level and loss aversion.
Appendix C: Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences over Two
Consumption Values
These two pairs of intertemporal options could be represented as: option A: (c,0,0)
and B: (o,c + /?,0); option C: (0,c,0) and D: (0,0,c + /?), where J3> 0 . There are three
possible reference levels tomorrow such that prob(r2 = rx - a) = p ,
prob(r2 = rx) = 1 - p - q , and prob(r2 = r{ + a) = q ; and there are five possible
reference levels the day after tomorrow, thus prob(r3 =r{- 2a) = p2 ,
prob{rl=r^-a)=2p(\-p-q) , prob(r3 = r,)= 2pq + (\-p-qf
prob{ri-rx+a) = 2q(\-p-q) , probfc = rx + 2a) = q2 , where rx-2a>0 , and
a > 0.
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c — y c ~h (3 — y
Case 1, where -1 < <———L < 0. The utility from option A is given by:
a a
E[Ua]= m(ct)+ g(c, |rx)+ E[m(c2 )+g{c2 \r2)+m(c3)+ g(c3 |r3)]
= m(c)+g(c\r^)+p(m(0)+g{p\r^ — «))+ (1 — — ^)(w(o)+ ))+ ^r(m(o) + ^(o|rj + a))
+ p2 (m(o)+ g(o|r, - 2a))+ 2p(l -p- q)(m(0)+ g(o|r, - a))+ (ipq + (1 -p-qf \m(0)+ g(o|r,))
+ 2q{\ - p - q)(m(0) + g(o|r, + a))+ q2 (m(o)+ g(o|r, + 2a))
= c-Ar/(3rl -c)+3{p-q)Xrja
The utility from option B is given by:
E[Ub \ = m{p ) + g(c, \rt)+ E[m{c2)+ g(c2 |r2)+ m(c3)+g(c3 |r3)]
= »i(0)+ g(o|r,)+ p(m(c + /?)+g(c + J3\r{ -a))+ (1 -p-q){m(c + /?)+ g(c + 0\r,))
+ q(m(c + j3)+g(c + j3\rl +«))+ p2(m(o)+ g(o|r, -2a))+2p{\- p - q){m(6)+g{p\^ -a))
+ (2pq + {\-p-qf )(m(o)+g(o|r|))+ 2q{\ - p - q)(m(0)+ g(o|r, + «))+ q2 (m(°)+ &(°ki + 2a))
= c- Aq{3rx - c)+3(p - q)Aqa - p{X-\)q(c-r{ + a)+/3 + Aq/3 - p(A-l)r//3
The utility from option C is given by:
E[UC] = m(cl)+ g{cl\rl)+E[m(c2)+g(c2\r2)+ m(c3)+ g(c3|r3)]
= m(0)+g(0|r,)+ p(m(c)+g(c|r,-a))+(l-p-q)(m(c)+g(c\rl))+q(m(c)+g(c\rt + a))
+ p2(/w(0)+g(o|r, -2a))+ 2p(l-p-^)(m(o)+g(o|r, -or))+ fepq + (1 -p-qfXm(°)+&(°k))
+ 2q(\ -p-q){m(0)+g(o|r, + a))+ q2(m(o)+g(o|r, + 2a))
= c-Aq(3r{ -c)+3(p - q)Aqa - q(A - l)rj(c - +a)
The utility from option D is given by:
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e[Ud\= m(cx)+g(cx |rx)+ e[m(c2)+ g(c2\r2)+ m(c3)+ g(c3\r3)]
= w(0)+g(0|r,)+p(m(0) + g(0|r1 -a))+(l - Jp-g)(w(o) + g(o|r1))+^(m(o)+g(o|r1 + a))
+ p2 (m(c +P)+g(c + 0\rx - 2a))+ 2p(\ -p- q)(m(c + 0)+g{c + 0\ rx - a))
+ (2pq + (1 - p - qf\m(c + 0)+ g(c + 0\rx))+ 2q{\ -p- q)(m(c + 0)+ g(c + 0\rx + a))
+ q2(m(c + p)+g(c + P\rx +2a))
= c-Aq(prx -c)+3(p-q)Aqa-2p(l-p-q)(A-l)q(c-rx +a)- p2(A - \)q(c - rx +2a)
+ P +Aqp-2p{A-\)qP - p2{A-\)qp
Therefore e(ua)>e(ub) but e(uc)<e(ud) when
f,7~blc~r0\ c-fr as lon8 as1 + Aq -\2- p -2q)p(A -\)q 1 + Aq -p\A-\)q
———— >c~r\ , Notice also that -1 < c~r' < C+P~r\ <q , therefore inequalities
2q +p-\ a a a
e(ua)>e(ub) and e(uc)<e(ud) holds, as long as p> 0 and q <-.
c — y c u — v
Case 2, where 0 < < ——- < 1. The utility from option A is given by:
a a
epA ] = ) + g(c, k,)+ E[m(c2) + g(c21r2)+ m(c3) + g(c3 |r3)]
= m{c)+ g(c\rx)+ p{m(o) + g(0rx -«))+ (1 -p- q){m(o) + g(o|r,))+ ^(m(o) + ^(o|r, + a))
+ p2 (m(0)+ g(o]r, - 2a))+ 2p(l - p - q)(m(0) + g(o|r, - a)) + {ipq + (1 - p - q)2\m(0) + g(o|r,))
+ 2q{\ ~p- q){m(0) + g(o|r, + a))+q2(m(o)+g(o\rx + 2a))
= c + q(c ~rx)~ 2Aqrx + 3(p - q)Aqa
The utility from option B is given by:
E\UB ] = m(cx) + g{cx\rx)+ E[m{c2) + g(c, \r2)+ m(c3) + g(c3 |r3)]
= m(0)+ g(o|r,)+ p(m(c + p)+ g(c + 0\rx - a))+ (1 - p - q)(m(c + p)+g(c + 0\rx))
+ q(m{c + 0)+ g(c + 0\rx + a))+p2(m(o)+g(ok-2af)+2p(\-p-q)(m(P)+g(p\rx -a))
+ (2pq + (1 -p-qf \m(0) + g(o|r,))+ 2^(1 - p - q)(m(0) + g(o^ + a))+ q2 (m(o)+ g(o|r, + 2a))
= c + q{c-rx)-2Aqa + 2{p - q)Aqa + {p-q)qa -q(A-1 )q(rx +a-c)
+ P + qp + q(A-\)qp
The utility from option C is given by:
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E[Uc\ = m(cl)+ g(c, |r,)+ E[m(c2) + g(c2 \r2)+ m(c3)+ g(c3 |r3)]
= m(6) + g(o|r,)+ p(m(c)+ g(c\rx - a))+ (1 -p- q)(m{c) + g(c\r{))+ q(m(c)+ g(c|r, + «))
+ p2(m(o) + g(o|r, - 2a))+2/?(l - p - q)(m{0) + g(o|r, - a))+ (ipq + (1 -p-q)1 )(w(o)+ g(o|r,))
+ 2^(l-/?-^r)(m(0) + g(0|r1 + a))+q2(m(o) +g(o\rx-2a))
= c + q{c - rx)-2Xr/a + 2(p - q)Xqa + {p- q)qa - q(X - l)q(r, + a - c)
The utility from option D is given by:
E[Ud ] = m(c,)+g(C| |rx)+E[m(c2 )+g(c2 \r2)+m(c}) + g(c3 \r3)]
= -a))+(l-/?-g)(m(o)+g(o|rJ)+g(ra(o)+g(o|r, +a))
+ p2(m(c + /?)+ g(c + J3\rx - 2a))+2p(l - p - q)(m(c + p)+g(c + p\rx - a))
+ (2pq + (1 -p-q)2 \m(c + p)+ g{c + 0\rx))+ 2^(1 - p - q)(m(c + p)+g(c + p\rx + «))
+ q2(m(c + 0)+ g(c + 0\ry + 2a))
= c + rj{c-rt)~ 2A,Tja + {p-q)Xija + 2(p - q)pa -q2(f-1)p(rx +2a-c)
-2q{\- p - q)(A-\)q(rx +a - c) +P+ qP + q2(2,-\)pp+2ql\-p - q)(A-\)qp
Therefore e(ua)>e(ub) but e(uc)<e(ud) when
p(l + 2q)a-q(l-2p-qXc-rl),;L_l,< pa-q{c-rQ as long as P>f fQr
1 +q + q(l-2p - \ + q + q[A-\)q q 2
c~r' <I, — > —Ja.—r2—^ for c~r\ >I . Notice also that 0 < c~r' < C +P~r\ < 1 ,
a 2 q 2(rx + a - c) a 2 a a
therefore inequalities e(ua)<e(ub) but e(uc)>e(ud) hold as long as Z<£zZL< 1,
q a
such that p <q . Hence the inequality inequalities e(ua)> e(ub) but e{uc ) < e(ud )
hold as long as p> q.
Result 3. (Dynamic inconsistency) Suppose an individual faces choices between
A:(c,0,0) and B: (0,c + P,0) and choices between C:(0,c,0) and D: (0,0,c + p);
and herpreferences are described by (1), (2), and (3) then
c — V c u — f
(i). When -1 < < < 0 the individual's preferences would be
a a
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e(ua)>E(ub) but E(Uc)<E(Ud) where
(p.-pjc-ry(\-2p,)a <p<c_-A±a ^ x= 1+ XV _ ^ ^ ^
X-\lp=+p_) X-\ p_\X — \)rj
1
p_> 0, and p+ < —.
c — Y c 3 — Y
(ii). When 0 < < < 1 the individual s preferences would be
a a
e(ua)>e(ub) but E(Uc)<E(Ud) where
r(l +2pt)a-(p.-p Hc-rl)< ra-(c-n) for 7 = £i and i + 7 as
z + (p,+2p.) Z+l■p. 1-1),
long as p_ > p+ .
Appendix D: Preferences Based on Realized Reference Levels
When it is tomorrow, the pair of options A and option B are irrelevant anymore; and
option C and option are reduced to: option C:(c,o) and D:(o,c + J3). There are three
possible realizations of her reference level tomorrow, which are r2 = r{ + a , r2=rx,
and r2=rt-a, and five possible reference levels the day after tomorrow, thus
prob{r, = rt - 2a) = p1 , prob(rj = rt - a) = 2p(1 -p-q) , prob(r3 = rx)=2pq +(\-p - q)2 ,
prob(r3 = rt+a)-2q(l-p - q), prob(r3 = rx + 2a) = q2, where r,-2«>0,and a>0.
C — Y C 3 — Y





E[uc\r2 = >\ -a\ = m(c2)+g(c2\r2)+E[m(c3)+g(c,\r3)]
= rn{c)+g{c\rx-a)+(\-p-q)(m{0)+g(p\rx -«))+^(m(o) + g(o|r,))
+ jp(m(0) + g(0|r,-2a))
= c — Xq{rx - a) + rj{c- rx +a)+(p-q)Ar/a
E[uD\r2 = rx-a\=m{c2)+g(c2\r2)+E[m(c2)+g{c2\r^
=m(0)+g(0|r,-a)+ p(m(c + /?)+g(c + 0\ry-2a))+{\-p-q){m{c+p)+g{c +fi\rx -a))
+ q(m(c + 0) + g(c + 0\rx))
=c- 2q{rx - a)+q{c -q + a)+ (p - q)qcc - q(X -1 )q(rx - c)
+ /? + q(3 + q(X -1 )q(3
Under the circumstance of rx-a<c<c + j3<rx, e(uc\r2=rl-a)>e(u0\r2 = rx-a) for
same range of parameters as decision was made in the first time period as long as
(p-q)a + q(rx-c)^ p{c-rx+a) _ Notice also ^ _l<cZrL<c+fi-r, <q ,
1 + 77 + <7(2 -1)// 1 + 2.77 - p[X-1)77 a a
therefore the inequality (p~l)a + P+(*\ ~c) >—p(c~r\ +Q:) holds as long as
1 + 77 + ^(2,-1)77 1 + 277-77(2-1)77
~
where p > 0 and q < — . Hence, the inequality
q 1 + 277 2




e[uc \r2 =rx]= m(cx) ■+ g(c, |r,)+ £[m(c2) ■+ g(c21r2)]
= m(c) + g{c\rx)+ 77(7/2(0)+ g(o|r[ -«))+ (1 -77-#)(/w(o)+ g(o|r,))+ ^(777(0) + g(o|q +a))
= c- Xq(lrx -c)+{p-q)Xqa
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E[uD\r2 = r,] = m{c,)+g(c\r{)+ E[m{c2)+g(c2 \r2)]
= m(0) + g(o|r,)+ p(m(c + /3) + g(c + 0\rx - a))+ (1 - p - q)(m(c + /?)+ g(c + 0\rx))
+ q(m(c + /3) + g(c + f3\rl + «))
= c-Arjrt| -(l -p)Xrj{rx -c)—qAija + pq{c-rx + «) + /? + (1 - p)/tijP + pq/3
Under the circumstance of r^-a <c<c + /3<r{, e(uc\r2 = rx)>e(ud\r2 -r{) for same
range ofparameters as decision was made in the first time period.
When r, = rx + a,
E[uc\r2 = r, + a\= m(c2) + g(c2\r2)+ E[m(c3) +g^r,)]
= m(c) + g(c\rt + a)+ p(m(o) + g(o|r,))+ (1 - p - ^)(m(o)+ g(o|r, + «))
+ tf(m(o)+ g(o|r1 +2a))
= c - Arj{2{r{ +a)-c)+{p- q)Apa
E\(JD\r2 = t\ + a] = m(c2 )+g(c2 |r2)+ E[m{c,)+ g(c3\r3)]
= m(0)+ g(o|r, + a)+ p(m(c + /?)+ g(c + 0\rx))+ (1 - p - q)(m(c + /?)+ g(c + 0\r{ + a))
+ q(m{c + 0)+ g{c + p\rx + 2a))
- c-Aq(2(rl + a)-c)+(p-q)Aqa + /3 + Aq/3
Under the circumstance of r{-a <c<c + /3<r{, e(uc\r2 =rt+a )<E(UD\r2 ~rx + a) for
all range of parameters.
c — y c B — y
Case 2, where 0 < < ——- < 1. The utilities from option C and option D are
a a
given by:
WTien r2 = rx - a ,
E[uc\r2 =r, - a] = m(c2) + g(c2 |r2)+ c[w(c3) + g(c3 |r3)]
= m(c)+g(c\rt -a)+ p(m(o)+ &((% - 2a))+ (1 -p- q)(m(0)+ g(o|r, - a))
+ q(m(0)+g(0\rl))
= c-Aq(r, -a)+q(c-rI +a)+(p-q)Aqa
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E[UD\r2 =rt -a] = m{c2) + g(c2\r2) + E[m{c,) + g(c3\p)]
= 777(0) + g(o|r, - a) + p(m(c + p) + g{c + P\rx - 2a))
+ (1 - p - q)(m(c + p) + g(c + 0\rx - a))■+ q(m(c + p) + g(c\rx))
= c-Ar/(rx - a)+ p{c - rx + a)+(p-q)rja + P + 77/?
Under the circumstance of rx<c<c +P<rx+a, e{uc\r2 = rx - a) > e(ud \r2 = >\ - a)
for same range of parameters as decision was made in the first time period as long as
(P~q)» > pg + g(r, -c) Notice also that 0 < c~r' < C + ^ ~ r' < 1 , the inequality
I + 77 1 + 77 + q(X -1)77 a a
(p-q)01 > Pg + g(ri ~c) holds as long as p-q > 7- + ?{ . Therefore, the inequality
I + 77 1 + 77 + q{X -1)77 (A —1)77
e(uc\r2 —rx —a)>e(ud\r2=rt-a) holds as long as p-q > 7 *+ .
When r2 = rx,
E[uc\r2 =r,]= m(c2) +g(c2\r2)+E[m(c3)+ g(c3 |r3)]
= tw(c) + g(c|r,)+ 77(777(0) + g(o|r, - a))+ (1 - p - q)(m(0) + g(o|r, ))
+ <7(777(0)+ g(0|r\ + a))
= c - Xrjrx + jj(c - rx)+(p - q)Xqa
E[UD\r2=rx\= 7?7(c2) + g(c2 \r2)+ E[m(c3) + g(c3 |r3)]
= 777(0) + g(0|r,)+ ^(777(0 + p)+ g(c + p\rx -a))+ (1 - p - q)(m(c + 0)+ g(c + p\rx))
+ q(m(c + p) + g{c + 0\rx + a))
= c-Xqrx + q(c - rx) + (p - q)qa - q(X-l)q(rx +a-c)+ P + 77/? + q(X -\)qp
Under the circumstance of rx<c<c + p<rx+a, e(uc|r2-rx)>e(uD\r2 = rx) for same
range ofparameters as decision was made in the first time period.
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When r2 = rx + a ,
E[UC \r2 = rx + a] = m(c2 )+g{c2 \r2) + E[m(c3)+ g(c3 |r3)]
= m(c)+ g[c\rx + a)+ p{m(0) + g(o|^ ))+ (1 -p- q)(m(o) + g(o|r, + a))
+ q(pi(6)+ g(o|r, + 2a))
= c-Aq(2(rx + a)- c) + (p - q)Aqa
E[UD\r2 = rx +a]=m(c2)+g(c2\r2)+E[m(c3)+g(c3\r,)]
= m(0)+ g(o|r, + a)+ p(m(c + 0)+ g{c + 0\rx))+ (1-p- q){m(c + 0)+ g(c + 0\ rx + a))
+ p(m{c+0)+g(c+p\rx+2a)
= c- Arj(2.{rx + a)-c)+(p-q)Ar/a - p(A -1)//(c-rx + 2a)+ /? + Atj/3- p(X - \)r/j3
Under the circumstance of rx<c<c + /3<rx+a, E{uc\r2=rx+a )> E0D\r2 = rx + a)
for same range of parameters as decision was made in the first time period as long as
pip-rx+2a) > pa + qk-c) Notice that 0 < S-IIl < c + <j, the inequality
1 + Aq - p[A-l)q 1 + q + q\A -1)77 a a
—pip ~r\+ 2a) > Pa + ffOl ~c) holds as long as p_ > 1 - 2p+ . Therefore, the
\ +Aq-p\A-\)q 1 + q + q[A -1)77
inequality E(uc\r2 =rx +a ) > e(ud \r2 = rx + a) holds as long as p > 1 - 2q where
P > q ■
Appendix E
th
In question 1, the endogenous reference level is "receiving £ 157 on September 16
2008". "receiving £157 on September 16th 2008" could be represented as option
A: (15716/09/08'°17/09/08)' in which the second number represents that the individual
will get nothing on September 17th 2008; and "delay payment by one day and gain
£l in compensation" could be represented as option B: (016/09/08,15817/09/08), in
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which the first number captures that the individual will get nothing on September
16th 2008.
Therefore the utility ofoption A is given by
UA (C''*) = UA (0 ^^16/09/08'^17/09/08 16/09/2008 '^17/09/08 ))
= w(l57) = 157
and the utility of option B is given by
UB (C' r) = UB ((^16/09/08 '^^17/09/08 )|0 5^16/09/08 '^17/09/08 ))
= m(l58) + g(oi6/09/08|l5716/09/08)+ g(l5817/09/08|Ol7/09/08 ) .
= 158-Tt/I 57 + 7158
Therefore, an individual would prefer option A to option B as long as
150 158
*1 > i 7T— , where X > > 1.
157 k - 307 157
In question 2, the endogenous reference level is "receiving £157 on March 17th
2008". "receiving £157 on March 17th 2008" could be represented as option A:
(l 5716/o3/o8 A7/09/08) 5 an(l "receiving £307 on September 17th 2008" could be
represented as option B: (O17/03/08,3 0717/09/08).
Therefore the utility of option A is given by
ua (c>r) = ua ((l 5717/03/08 ,017/09/08 )(l5717/03/0g j017/09/08
=m(l57) = 157
and the utility of option B is given by
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UB (C''") UB ((Ol7/03/08 '307,7/09/08 K1 ^17/03/08 '^17/09/08 ))
= ^(307)+ ^(o,y/03/08 |l5717/03/0g)+ g"(307,7/09/0810,7/09/08 ) •
= 307-1/7157 + 7307
Therefore, an individual would prefer option B to option A, as long as
150 , . 307 ,
7 < , where 1 > > 1.
1571-307 157
Notice that as long as 1 > 1, the inequality - < 7 < — holds,
1571-158 1571-307
hence an individual would prefer option A to option B in the first question but prefer
option B to option A in the second question.
In question 3, the endogenous reference level is "receiving £67 on June 16th 2008".
"receiving £ 67 on June 16th 2008" could be represented as option C:
(6716/06/08 '0,6/09/08 '0.7/09/08'0,7/03/09) J "receiving £157 on September 16th 2008" could
be represented as option D: (o,6/06/08,157,6/09/08 ,017/09/08 ,0,7/03/09); and "receiving
£158 on September 17th 2008" could be represented as option B:
(^17/06/08 '^16/09/08 '^^17/09/08 '^17/03/09 ) •
Therefore the utility ofoption B is given by
Ub (C' = UB ((^17/06/08 '^16/09/08 ^^17/09/08 '^17/03/09 K^17/06/08 '^16/09/2008 '^17/09/08 '^17/03/09
— w(l 58) + g(o,7/06/08 167,7/06/08)+ g(l 58[6/09/0810[6/09/08 )
= 158-1767 + 7158
and the utility of option D is given by
156
UD (c, r) — UD ((0,7/06/08,15716/09/08,017/09/08,017/03/09 )|(6717/06/08 ?016/09/2008 ,017/09/08 ,017/03/09))
= m(157) + g"(oi7/06/0816717/06/08)+ g(l 5716/09/081016/09/08)
= 157-A?767 + 77l 57
Therefore, an individual would prefer option B to option D, which is inconsistent
with the result of question 1.
157
